diff --git a/src/skillspector/nested_artifacts.py b/src/skillspector/nested_artifacts.py
index 811586f46..1a48c257c 100644
--- a/src/skillspector/nested_artifacts.py
+++ b/src/skillspector/nested_artifacts.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import io
+import re
 import stat
 import struct
 import time
@@ -389,6 +390,37 @@ def _zip_member_is_link(info: zipfile.ZipInfo) -> bool:
     b"\xbf\xba\xfe\xca",
 )
 
+_TYPESCRIPT_DECLARATION_SUFFIXES = (".d.ts", ".d.cts", ".d.mts")
+_TYPESCRIPT_DECLARATION_FILE = re.compile(
+    r"\A\s*(?:"
+    r"(?:declare\s+(?:const|let|var|function|class|namespace|module)\b[^;{}]*;)|"
+    r"(?:(?:export\s+)?(?:interface|namespace)\b[^{}]*\{[^{}]*\}\s*;?)|"
+    r"(?:(?:export\s+)?type\b[^;{}]+;)|"
+    r"(?:import\s+type\b[^;{}]+;)|"
+    r"(?:export\s*\{[^{}]*\}\s*;?)"
+    r")+(?:\s|/\*.*?\*/|//[^\r\n]*)*\Z",
+    re.DOTALL,
+)
+
+
+def _looks_like_typescript_declaration(path: str, data: bytes) -> bool:
+    """Recognize clearly inert TypeScript declaration content conservatively.
+
+    Declaration suffixes alone are not trusted: a file named ``evil.d.cts``
+    can still contain executable CommonJS. Unknown or non-text content stays
+    executable so this check cannot create a name-based security bypass.
+    """
+    name = Path(path).name.lower()
+    if not name.endswith(_TYPESCRIPT_DECLARATION_SUFFIXES) or not data:
+        return False
+    try:
+        text = data.decode("utf-8")
+    except UnicodeDecodeError:
+        return False
+    text = re.sub(r"/\*.*?\*/|//[^\r\n]*", "", text, flags=re.DOTALL)
+    text = re.sub(r"\s+", " ", text).strip()
+    return bool(text.strip() and _TYPESCRIPT_DECLARATION_FILE.fullmatch(text))
+
 
 def has_binary_executable_magic(data: bytes) -> bool:
     """Return whether canonical bytes begin with supported executable magic."""
@@ -399,7 +431,12 @@ def is_executable_content(path: str, data: bytes, mode: int = 0) -> bool:
     """Classify filesystem and archive content with one static-only policy."""
     suffix = Path(path).suffix.lower()
     executable_magic = data.startswith(b"#!") or has_binary_executable_magic(data)
-    return suffix in _EXECUTABLE_SUFFIXES or executable_magic or bool(mode & 0o111)
+    declaration_only = _looks_like_typescript_declaration(path, data)
+    return (
+        (suffix in _EXECUTABLE_SUFFIXES and not declaration_only)
+        or executable_magic
+        or bool(mode & 0o111)
+    )
 
 
 def _member_executable(info: zipfile.ZipInfo, safe_name: str, data: bytes) -> bool:
diff --git a/tests/nodes/test_nested_artifacts.py b/tests/nodes/test_nested_artifacts.py
index 79d9933d2..b599d630a 100644
--- a/tests/nodes/test_nested_artifacts.py
+++ b/tests/nodes/test_nested_artifacts.py
@@ -68,6 +68,31 @@ def _document_members(**extra: bytes) -> dict[str, bytes]:
     }
 
 
+def test_typescript_declaration_files_are_not_executable_by_name_alone() -> None:
+    declaration = b"export interface Options { retries?: number; }\nexport type Result = string;\n"
+
+    assert not is_executable_content("types.d.cts", declaration)
+    assert not is_executable_content("types.d.mts", declaration)
+
+
+def test_runtime_code_in_typescript_declaration_named_file_stays_executable() -> None:
+    runtime = b'declare const marker: string;\nrequire("child_process").execSync(marker);\n'
+
+    assert is_executable_content("evil.d.cts", runtime)
+
+
+def test_typescript_side_effect_import_in_declaration_named_file_stays_executable() -> None:
+    runtime = b"import './payload.js';\nexport type Result = string;\n"
+
+    assert is_executable_content("evil.d.mts", runtime)
+
+
+def test_mixed_typescript_declaration_and_runtime_stays_executable() -> None:
+    runtime = b"export type Result = string;\nconsole.log('runtime');\n"
+
+    assert is_executable_content("evil.d.ts", runtime)
+
+
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(
     ("path", "payload"),
     [