.env.example

# OracleDesk backend configuration. Copy to .env and fill in what you need.
# Every value here is empty or a local default. Never commit a filled-in .env.
# Variables are validated at startup (src/config/index.ts); a bad value stops
# the server with a message naming the variable.

# ── Server ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
NODE_ENV=development
PORT=8000
# Postgres and Redis. These defaults match docker-compose.yml (local only,
# not secrets). Point them at your own servers for anything shared.
DATABASE_URL=postgresql://oracledesk:oracledesk@127.0.0.1:5433/oracledesk
# Alternatively, mount the URL from a file: DATABASE_URL_FILE=/run/secrets/database_url
# Every secret below also accepts <NAME>_FILE (env/file provider) — see #145.

# ── Secret loading (#145) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
# env: process environment (default); file: <NAME>_FILE mounts; vault: Vault KV v2.
SECRETS_PROVIDER=env
# Refresh interval for file/vault providers (minimum 30000 ms).
SECRETS_REFRESH_MS=300000
# How long a rotated JWT_SECRET remains valid for already-issued tokens.
JWT_PREVIOUS_SECRET_GRACE_SECS=86400
# Required only when SECRETS_PROVIDER=vault.
VAULT_ADDR=
VAULT_TOKEN_FILE=
VAULT_KV_PATH=
REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379
# Comma-separated browser origins allowed to call the API.
CORS_ORIGINS=http://localhost:3000

# ── Auth ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# JWT signing secret, at least 32 characters. Required in production. If
# empty in development, a random one is generated per process.
JWT_SECRET=
# Stellar secret seed (S…) that signs SEP-10 login challenges. Use a fresh
# key that holds no funds and is not the agent key. Required in production;
# generated per process in development if empty.
AUTH_SIGNING_SECRET=
# Domain shown in the challenge transaction (the frontend's host).
AUTH_HOME_DOMAIN=localhost
AUTH_WEB_AUTH_DOMAIN=
# Comma-separated G… addresses seeded as super admins on first deploy.
# After the RBAC tables exist, the database is authoritative and this list is
# not consulted per request.
ADMIN_ADDRESSES=
# Sensitive admin actions need a wallet proof no older than this (seconds).
STEP_UP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS=300

# ── Auth: challenge abuse resistance (#50) ─────────────────────────────────
# Max outstanding (unexpired, unused) challenges per address / per network.
AUTH_MAX_OUTSTANDING_PER_ADDRESS=5
AUTH_MAX_OUTSTANDING_PER_IP=30
# Above this many challenges issued per minute, clients must solve a
# hashcash-style proof of work (SAT-style). 0 disables the throttle.
AUTH_POW_THRESHOLD_PER_MIN=600
AUTH_POW_BITS=18
AUTH_POW_TTL_SECONDS=60
# How long a signed challenge stays valid, in seconds.
AUTH_CHALLENGE_TTL_SECONDS=300
# Salt for hashing client IPs. Generated per process if empty; set explicitly
# to keep hashes stable across restarts.
AUTH_IP_HASH_SALT=
# Express `trust proxy` setting (e.g. "1", "loopback", "true"). Set this when
# the app runs behind a load balancer so client IPs are read correctly.
TRUST_PROXY=
# Redis socket timeouts (ms) for the fail-closed auth store.
REDIS_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS=500
REDIS_CONNECT_TIMEOUT_MS=2000

# ── Auth: SEP-45 contract-account login (#47) ──────────────────────────────
# Enable login for smart-wallet (C…) accounts.
SEP45_ENABLED=false
# The deployed web_auth_verify contract id (C…). Required when enabled.
WEB_AUTH_CONTRACT_ID=
# Soroban RPC used for SEP-45 simulation; defaults to STELLAR_RPC_URL.
SEP45_RPC_URL=
# Public keys of previous server signing keys that may still verify
# challenges they issued, as G…[@ISO-8601-retirement]. Needed during a
# signing-key rotation overlap.
AUTH_PREVIOUS_SIGNING_KEYS=

# ── Stellar network ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
STELLAR_RPC_URL=https://soroban-testnet.stellar.org
STELLAR_NETWORK_PASSPHRASE=Test SDF Network ; September 2015

# Contract ids. Empty means "use src/generated/deployments.testnet.json".
MARKET_CORE_CONTRACT_ID=
TREASURY_CONTRACT_ID=
RESOLVER_CONTRACT_ID=
REASONING_REGISTRY_CONTRACT_ID=
USDC_CONTRACT_ID=

# Recipient of premium (daily pass) payments, G… or C…. Empty means the
# treasury contract, which makes subscription revenue agent trading capital.
# That is a product decision; see docs/STATUS.md.
PAYMENTS_RECIPIENT=
# Daily pass price in 7-decimal USDC base units (5000000 = 0.50 USDC).
DAILY_PASS_PRICE_RAW=5000000

# ── Server-issued payment intents (#52) ───────────────────────────────────
PAYMENT_INTENT_TTL_SECONDS=900
PAYMENT_INTENT_MAX_OPEN=3
PAYMENT_INTENT_CONFIRM_ENABLED=true
PAYMENT_INTENT_CONFIRM_CRON=*/20 * * * * *
PAYMENT_INTENT_CONFIRM_BATCH=20
PAYMENT_INTENT_MAX_ATTEMPTS=60
PAYMENT_INTENT_RETRY_BASE_MS=5000
PAYMENT_INTENT_RETRY_MAX_MS=300000
PAYMENT_INTENT_LATE_GRACE_SECONDS=120

# ── Agent execution ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# dry-run (default): every write is built and simulated, never signed or sent.
# live: writes are signed with AGENT_SECRET_KEY and submitted. Testnet only;
# the server refuses live mode on any other network.
CHAIN_EXECUTION_MODE=dry-run
# WARNING: testnet only. The agent's secret seed (S…). It controls treasury
# trades up to the treasury's caps. Never put a mainnet key here.
AGENT_SECRET_KEY=
# Source-account sequencing (#36). Live writes take a fenced per-account lock
# in Redis before allocating a sequence number. The TTL must cover simulate +
# sign + sendTransaction; the heartbeat renews it while the transaction is in
# flight; waiters give up (with a retryable error) after the wait timeout.
SEQ_LOCK_TTL_MS=45000
SEQ_LOCK_HEARTBEAT_MS=15000
SEQ_LOCK_WAIT_MS=120000

# Write retry policy (#40). Live writes are retried only when the failure is
# provably not applied (transient RPC, bad sequence, insufficient fee, expiry,
# resource/state). Ambiguous outcomes and contract/auth/balance errors are never
# retried. Backoff is jittered exponential, capped by the deadline.
CHAIN_RETRY_MAX_ATTEMPTS=3
CHAIN_RETRY_BASE_MS=250
CHAIN_RETRY_MAX_MS=5000
CHAIN_RETRY_DEADLINE_MS=30000

# Fee bump sponsorship (#38). When an outbox row stays pending past
# FEE_BUMP_AFTER_LEDGERS, its stored inner envelope is wrapped unchanged in a
# fee bump paid by FEE_PAYER_SECRET (testnet only, must differ from
# AGENT_SECRET_KEY and AUTH_SIGNING_SECRET). The inclusion fee escalates by
# FEE_BUMP_MULTIPLIER up to FEE_BUMP_MAX_STROOPS and stops after
# FEE_BUMP_MAX_ATTEMPTS or at the inner transaction's maxTime.
FEE_BUMP_ENABLED=false
# WARNING: testnet only. A distinct funded account's secret seed (S…).
FEE_PAYER_SECRET=
FEE_BUMP_AFTER_LEDGERS=3
FEE_BUMP_MULTIPLIER=2
FEE_BUMP_MAX_STROOPS=10000000
FEE_BUMP_MAX_ATTEMPTS=3

# Resolution spec committed at market creation (signer mode). Empty signers
# means the agent account is the only signer.
RESOLUTION_SIGNERS=
RESOLUTION_THRESHOLD=1
RESOLUTION_DISPUTE_WINDOW_SECS=86400

# ── Price-mode markets (#90) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Reflector (SEP-40) feed registry. JSON keyed by network passphrase → asset
# symbol → feed. Addresses are never hard-coded: every entry carries a `source`
# citation (doc URL or on-chain lookup). Empty disables price mode, so every
# CRYPTO market falls back to signer mode.
#   {"Test SDF Network ; September 2015":{"BTC":{"reflector":"C…","asset":{"kind":"other","symbol":"BTC"},"quote":"USD","maxStaleness":900,"source":"https://reflector.network/docs"}}}
REFLECTOR_FEEDS_JSON={}
# resolve_price retries PriceUnavailable/StalePrice until this deadline, then
# logs an ERROR PRICE_RESOLUTION_STUCK for a guardian to void the market.
PRICE_RESOLUTION_MAX_WAIT_SECS=86400
PRICE_RESOLUTION_POLL_MS=300000
# Failure breaker: N chain-write failures within the window pause the agent (#79)
AGENT_FAILURE_THRESHOLD=5
AGENT_FAILURE_WINDOW_MS=1800000

# ── Dynamic Fee Policies (#39) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# JSON override of per-operation class inclusion fee policies (percentile, floor, cap, budget in stroops).
# Classes: market_create, trade, trace_publish, maintenance.
# Example: FEE_POLICY_JSON={"trade":{"percentile":"p80","floor":"10000","cap":"2000000","budget":"25000000"}}
FEE_POLICY_JSON=
FEE_STATS_CACHE_MS=10000
FEE_STATS_MAX_AGE_MS=60000

# ── Explicit Timebounds & Rebuilds (#42) ───────────────────────────────────
# Transaction timeouts in seconds per operation class
TIMEOUT_MARKET_CREATE_SECONDS=60
TIMEOUT_TRADE_SECONDS=30
TIMEOUT_TRACE_PUBLISH_SECONDS=45
TIMEOUT_MAINTENANCE_SECONDS=30
# Auth entry expiration ledger margin added past the transaction deadline
AUTH_EXPIRY_MARGIN_LEDGERS=12
# Maximum times an expired transaction may be safely rebuilt and resubmitted
MAX_REBUILD_COUNT=2

# ── Channel Accounts (#37) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Comma-separated Stellar secret keys (S...) for parallel transaction submission
CHANNEL_SECRET_KEYS=
# Optional path to a file containing channel secret seeds (mode 0600)
CHANNELS_SECRETS_FILE=
# Minimum balance in XLM before a channel account is paused from rotation
CHANNEL_MIN_BALANCE_XLM=5
# Maximum time in milliseconds to wait for a channel lease
CHANNEL_ACQUIRE_TIMEOUT_MS=5000
# Duration in milliseconds of an exclusive channel lease
CHANNEL_LEASE_MS=60000

# Transaction outbox (#35): every live write persists its signed envelope and
# hash before submission; a recovery worker resolves non-terminal rows at boot
# and on this interval (one instance at a time via a Redis lock).
OUTBOX_POLL_MS=5000
# How long a write waits inline for confirmation before returning CHAIN_PENDING
# and leaving resolution (and the completion handler) to the worker.
OUTBOX_INLINE_WAIT_MS=30000

# Contract spec compatibility gate (#34): at boot the backend fetches each
# deployed contract's wasm hash and embedded spec and diffs them against the
# synced bindings. Empty derives from CHAIN_EXECUTION_MODE: live → enforce
# (refuse to start on breaking drift), dry-run → warn. off skips the check.
SPEC_COMPAT_ENFORCE=

# Accept a well-formed inbound X-Request-Id; set false without a trusted proxy.
TRUST_INBOUND_REQUEST_ID=true

# Event indexer (Stellar RPC getEvents poller).
INDEXER_ENABLED=true
INDEXER_POLL_MS=5000

# ── Socket.io throttling & slow-consumer guard (Issue #96) ──────────────────
# Price tick coalescing interval (ms); at most one MARKET_PRICE emitted per market per tick.
SOCKET_PRICE_TICK_MS=1000
# Deliver TRADE_EXECUTED as volatile (skip stalled/congested clients).
SOCKET_TRADE_VOLATILE=true
# Max ledger lag to classify an event as live vs historical catch-up.
SOCKET_LIVE_LEDGER_LAG=12
# Buffered bytes threshold to degrade socket (stop sending trades, keep price ticks).
SOCKET_SLOW_WARN_BYTES=262144
# Buffered bytes threshold to disconnect stalled consumer socket.
SOCKET_SLOW_DROP_BYTES=2097152
# Check interval for slow-consumer buffer inspection (ms).
SOCKET_SLOW_CHECK_MS=2000

# ── Socket.io hardening & connection limits (Issue #97) ─────────────────────
# Maximum concurrent connections per instance.
SOCKET_MAX_CONNECTIONS=5000
# Maximum concurrent connections per client IP.
SOCKET_MAX_PER_IP=20
# Connection rate limit (new connections per IP per minute).
SOCKET_CONNECT_RATE_PER_MIN=60
# Max inbound frame/buffer size (bytes).
SOCKET_MAX_BUFFER_BYTES=16384
# Allowed transports: websocket,polling or websocket.
SOCKET_TRANSPORTS=websocket,polling
# Max inbound application events per socket per 10 seconds.
SOCKET_INBOUND_EVENTS_PER_10S=20
# Fraction of socket connections/disconnections logged at info level (0.0 to 1.0).
SOCKET_LOG_SAMPLE_RATE=0.01
# Comma-separated CIDRs of trusted reverse proxies for X-Forwarded-For parsing.
TRUSTED_PROXIES=
# Comma-separated CIDRs exempt from per-IP connection limits (NAT / monitoring).
SOCKET_IP_EXEMPT_CIDRS=

# ── Chain read cache (Issue #98) ────────────────────────────────────────────
# Read-through cache for live Soroban contract simulation reads.
CHAIN_CACHE_ENABLED=true
# TTL for cached chain reads (ms).
CHAIN_CACHE_TTL_MS=5000
# Negative TTL for contract errors such as MarketNotFound (ms).
CHAIN_CACHE_NEG_TTL_MS=2000
# Max wait time for another node's single-flight lock before direct simulation (ms).
CHAIN_CACHE_WAIT_MS=1500

# Health probes (#111): /livez (process only) and /readyz (dependencies).
# HEALTH_CRITICAL: comma list of database,redis,rpc,indexer that fail readiness.
HEALTH_CRITICAL=database,redis
HEALTH_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS=1500
HEALTH_CACHE_TTL_MS=2000
INDEXER_MAX_LAG_LEDGERS=120
INDEXER_MAX_STALENESS_MS=60000
LIVENESS_MAX_LOOP_DELAY_MS=2000
# Drain + close must fit the 15 s forced-exit window.
SHUTDOWN_DRAIN_MS=5000

# ── LLM providers (market and trace generation) ────────────────────────────
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=
GEMINI_API_KEY=

# ── IPFS (Pinata) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
PINATA_API_KEY=
PINATA_SECRET_API_KEY=
IPFS_GATEWAY_URL=https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs
# pinata (default) or local (development only; stores bytes in .ipfs-local/).
IPFS_TRANSPORT=pinata
IPFS_LOCAL_DIR=.ipfs-local

# ── Data sources ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
NEWSAPI_KEY=
FRED_API_KEY=
# Signal store (#73): re-fetch a source once its last successful fetch is
# older than this; raw provider payloads are kept this many days.
SIGNAL_REFRESH_MINUTES=15
SIGNAL_RAW_RETENTION_DAYS=7

# ── Trader forecaster (#75) ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# The trader's own probability: an LLM estimate (never shown the price) and a
# base-rate model, combined by inverse variance in log-odds and shrunk toward
# 0.5. Samples > 1 take the median and add the spread to the uncertainty.
FORECAST_LLM_SAMPLES=1
FORECAST_SHRINK=0.15
FORECAST_MAX_MARKETS_PER_CYCLE=5
FORECAST_MAX_LLM_CALLS_PER_CYCLE=10
FORECAST_CACHE_TTL_HOURS=6

# ── Semantic dedup (#69) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
# none keeps the lexical duplicate check. gemini uses GEMINI_API_KEY, openai
# uses OPENAI_API_KEY (and OPENAI_BASE_URL). Needs the pgvector extension.
EMBEDDING_PROVIDER=none
# Defaults: gemini text-embedding-004, openai text-embedding-3-small.
EMBEDDING_MODEL=
# Must equal the markets.questionEmbedding column, vector(768).
EMBEDDING_DIM=768
# Provisional: recalibrate with `npm run calibrate:dedup` on your model.
DEDUP_SIM_THRESHOLD=0.85
DEDUP_DATE_WINDOW_DAYS=3

# ── Calibration (#68) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Slices with fewer resolved markets return insufficientData.
MIN_CALIBRATION_MARKETS=20
# time | last | first: how a market's weight is split between its traces.
CALIBRATION_WEIGHTING=time
# Shrink the trader's probability toward 0.5 by the fitted factor (needs 50+ markets).
CALIBRATION_SHRINKAGE_ENABLED=false

# ── Build metadata (#66) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Commit recorded in trace provenance. Optional; set by CI or the deploy.
GIT_SHA=

# ── LLM budgets and shared guards (#71) ────────────────────────────────────
# Per UTC day, across every provider and instance (state lives in Redis).
LLM_DAILY_TOKEN_BUDGET=2000000
# USD micro-units (1_000_000 = $1); an estimate from a static price table.
LLM_DAILY_COST_BUDGET_MICROS=20000000
# Percent of both budgets reserved for admin-triggered generation; cron work
# stops at budget - reserve.
LLM_ADMIN_RESERVE_PCT=10
LLM_ANTHROPIC_RPM=12
LLM_GEMINI_RPM=15
LLM_BREAKER_FAILURE_THRESHOLD=3
LLM_BREAKER_OPEN_MS=3600000
# closed: refuse LLM calls when Redis is down (recommended in production).
# open: fall back to a per-process limiter and log a warning.
LLM_REDIS_FAIL_MODE=closed

# ── LLM router (#157) ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# OpenAI or any OpenAI-compatible endpoint. The router can use them in a task
# policy even if Anthropic/Gemini are configured.
OPENAI_API_KEY=
OPENAI_BASE_URL=
# Optional JSON policy overriding some/all tasks, e.g.
# {"market_generation":[{"provider":"anthropic","model":"claude-sonnet-4-6",
#   "temperature":0.2,"maxTokens":4096,"timeoutMs":60000}]}
# Or a path to a JSON file. Missing tasks keep the built-in default policy.
LLM_POLICY=
LLM_POLICY_FILE=

# ── IPFS content store (#100) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Per-object cap and total Postgres budget for verified pinned bytes.
IPFS_CACHE_MAX_OBJECT_BYTES=262144
IPFS_CACHE_BUDGET_BYTES=268435456

# ── Transparency reports (#159) ────────────────────────────────────────────
REPORTS_ENABLED=false
REPORT_CRON=10 0 * * *
# dry-run: pin + persist, never publish on-chain. live: publish with the agent.
REPORT_MODE=dry-run
# URL placed in the report's method.doc field.
REPORT_METHOD_DOC=https://github.com/OracleDesk/oracledesk-backend/blob/main/docs/transparency-reports.md

# ── Treasury admin console (#156) ──────────────────────────────────────────
# Lifetime of a prepared unsigned transaction.
TREASURY_OP_TTL_SECONDS=3600
# Optional stricter backend policy for withdraw operations.
TREASURY_WITHDRAW_MIN_SIGNERS=0
# Trader sizing (#76): share of the treasury's daily and per-market headroom
# (basis points) the trader leaves unused, for races with market creation and
# daily-window rollover between the budget read and the submit.
TREASURY_HEADROOM_SAFETY_BPS=500
# ── Resilience & Timeouts ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
TIMEOUT_RPC_READ_MS=8000
TIMEOUT_RPC_WRITE_MS=45000
TIMEOUT_RPC_EVENTS_MS=15000
TIMEOUT_LLM_MS=60000
TIMEOUT_IPFS_PIN_MS=20000
TIMEOUT_IPFS_FETCH_MS=15000
TIMEOUT_DATASOURCE_MS=10000

# Concurrency bulkheads
BULKHEAD_LLM=2
BULKHEAD_IPFS=4
BULKHEAD_RPC_READ=16
BULKHEAD_RPC_WRITE=4
BULKHEAD_RPC_EVENTS=4
BULKHEAD_DATASOURCE=8
BULKHEAD_QUEUE=32

# Deadlines & caps
HTTP_REQUEST_TIMEOUT_MS=30000
CYCLE_DEADLINE_MS=600000
IPFS_MAX_BYTES=2097152

# ── Trace Audit (Registry Verification) ────────────────────────────────────
TRACE_AUDIT_ENABLED=true
TRACE_AUDIT_CRON=40 */2 * * *
TRACE_AUDIT_RECHECK_HOURS=168
TRACE_AUDIT_MAX_RPC=500
TRACE_AUDIT_MAX_FETCHES=100
TRACE_AUDIT_MAX_BYTES=2097152

# Trace publication queue (#131): pins traces, waits for the market to be
# on-chain, publishes once, and confirms via the indexer's TracePublished event.
TRACE_PUBLISH_ENABLED=true
TRACE_PUBLISH_CRON=*/30 * * * * *
TRACE_PUBLISH_MAX_ATTEMPTS=8
TRACE_CONFIRM_TIMEOUT_MS=600000

# ── Market seed policy (#82) ───────────────────────────────────────────────
# Amounts are 7-decimal base units (10000000 = 1 USDC).
LP_LOSS_BUDGET_RAW=250000000
MM_DAILY_SHARE_BPS=4000
MAX_SEED_FRACTION_BPS=500
MAX_UNRESOLVED_SEEDED_RAW=10000000000
# Base seed per category in USDC; scaled by time to close, never above 2x the LLM's suggestion.
SEED_CATEGORY_BASE_USDC={"FED":300,"ECB":250,"MACRO":200,"CRYPTO":200,"ELECTION":200,"GEOPOLITICAL":150,"POLITICS":150,"SPORTS":120,"ENTERTAINMENT":100}

# ── Market correlations (#80) ──────────────────────────────────────────────
# Price series are resampled onto this grid; a pair needs MIN_OVERLAP intervals
# where both markets traded, and PRIOR_KAPPA is the pseudo-count of the
# shrinkage toward the category prior.
CORRELATION_GRID_SECS=3600
CORRELATION_WINDOW_DAYS=14
CORRELATION_MIN_OVERLAP=12
CORRELATION_PRIOR_KAPPA=20

# ── Market lifecycle reconciler (#83) ──────────────────────────────────────
# Compares markets.status/price/close time/hashes with market-core every ~10
# minutes (one instance, advisory lock), repairs the safe classes, reports the rest.
RECONCILE_ENABLED=true
RECONCILE_MAX_MARKETS=200
RECONCILE_CONCURRENCY=4
RECONCILE_MAX_RPC_CALLS=400
RECONCILE_INDEXER_LAG_LEDGERS=20

# ── Copy Trading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
COPY_TRADE_TTL_MINUTES=30
COPY_TRADE_MAX_PENDING=5

# ── Seed / snapshot (#147) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
# The seed refuses production and non-local databases. Set to 1 only when you
# intentionally seed a remote development database.
SEED_ALLOW_REMOTE=0
# Base id for seeded on-chain market/trace rows, and the starting ledger.
SEED_ONCHAIN_BASE=1000000
SEED_BASE_LEDGER=6000000
# Optional comma-separated real testnet ids to link (read-only).
SEED_TESTNET_MARKET_IDS=
# Required by scripts/snapshot-export.ts; never commit the value.
SNAPSHOT_SALT=

# ── Event bus and socket fan-out (#93) ─────────────────────────────────────
# Redis Streams between the indexer and the socket.io fan-out. Set false to use
# an in-process bus (one instance only, no Redis needed for events).
EVENT_BUS_ENABLED=true
# Approximate stream cap; chain_events remains the durable history.
EVENT_BUS_MAXLEN=100000
# Defaults to <hostname>-<pid>.
INSTANCE_ID=

# ── Dispute monitor and guardian alerts (#92) ──────────────────────────────
DISPUTE_MONITOR_ENABLED=true
# Confidence needed for an AGREE or DISAGREE verdict.
DISPUTE_AGREE_MIN_CONFIDENCE=0.8
# Markets with at least this much liquidity (USDC) need a cited primary,
# non-news source before the independent review may say AGREE.
DISPUTE_HIGH_VALUE_LIQUIDITY=10000
# The resolver admin account that may call cancel_proposal / guardian_void_market.
# Unset: the admin dispute transaction endpoints return 503 GUARDIAN_NOT_CONFIGURED.
RESOLVER_GUARDIAN_ADDRESS=
# Comma-separated JSON webhooks, signed with ALERT_WEBHOOK_SECRET (HMAC-SHA256,
# header X-OracleDesk-Signature). These URLs contain tokens and are never logged.
ALERT_WEBHOOK_URLS=
ALERT_SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL=
ALERT_WEBHOOK_SECRET=