diff --git a/NEWS.md b/NEWS.md
index e2ee8dc5d..69aeed200 100644
--- a/NEWS.md
+++ b/NEWS.md
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ border-radius: 128px;
 
 ## v2.5.5
 
+- Features
+    - `csrf_trusted_origins` setting for CSRF 403s behind a reverse proxy.
 - Fixes
     - Online tagging matches saved for review by 2.5.3 no longer break the
       review list and scan status with "No module named 'numpy'". They are
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index d382facab..38abb37cb 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -471,6 +471,10 @@ present.
 # websockets = true
 # HTTP path prefix for codex (e.g. "/codex" for reverse proxy sub-path)
 # url_path_prefix = ""
+# Public origins accepted for CSRF when a reverse proxy serves Codex under
+# another scheme or host than Codex sees (e.g. https in front of http).
+# First make sure the proxy sends X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host.
+# csrf_trusted_origins = ["https://comics.example.com"]
 
 # [logging]
 # Log level: TRACE, DEBUG, INFO, SUCCESS, WARNING, ERROR, CRITICAL
@@ -569,6 +573,9 @@ Environment variables override values set in the TOML config file.
   Default true.
 - `GRANIAN_URL_PATH_PREFIX` HTTP path prefix for codex (e.g. "/codex" for
   reverse proxy sub-path). Defaults to "".
+- `CODEX_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS` Comma-separated public origins (e.g.
+  `https://comics.example.com`) accepted for CSRF behind a reverse proxy. See
+  [CSRF 403 behind a proxy](#csrf-403-behind-a-proxy). Defaults to none.
 
 ##### Repair
 
@@ -697,6 +704,27 @@ of the `/codex` location with `auth_request`, exempt the API the way Codex's own
 examples do (`location /codex/api { auth_request off; ... }`); the `^~` note
 above is what keeps the static assets reachable.
 
+#### CSRF 403 behind a proxy
+
+If logging in or saving changes fails with a 403 "CSRF Failed" error behind a
+reverse proxy, first make sure the proxy sends `X-Forwarded-Proto` and
+`X-Forwarded-Host` (the nginx example above does). Codex compares them with the
+browser's `Origin` header. Only if the proxy can't send them, or the error
+persists, add the public origin the browser uses to `config/codex.toml`:
+
+```toml
+[server]
+csrf_trusted_origins = ["https://comics.example.com"]
+```
+
+or set `CODEX_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS="https://comics.example.com"` (comma
+separated for more than one). An origin is `scheme://host[:port]` with no path;
+`https://*.example.com` trusts every subdomain.
+
+Do not remove Django's `CsrfViewMiddleware` to work around the error. The API
+enforces CSRF through Django REST Framework anyway, so removing it doesn't fix
+the API, and it strips CSRF protection from Codex's other pages.
+
 #### Preserving the Codex Server Header
 
 Codex identifies itself with a `Server: codex/<version>` response header, which
diff --git a/codex/settings/__init__.py b/codex/settings/__init__.py
index cf7a3ff77..936f39bad 100644
--- a/codex/settings/__init__.py
+++ b/codex/settings/__init__.py
@@ -31,7 +31,9 @@
     get_float,
     get_int,
     get_str,
+    get_str_list,
     load_codex_config,
+    normalize_csrf_trusted_origins,
     normalize_url_path_prefix,
 )
 from codex.settings.logging import get_logging_settings
@@ -535,6 +537,14 @@ def _get_secure_csp(features: FeatureFlags) -> dict[str, list[str]]:
 # Proxy headers
 USE_X_FORWARDED_HOST = True
 SECURE_PROXY_SSL_HEADER = ("HTTP_X_FORWARDED_PROTO", "https")
+# Public origins (e.g. "https://comics.example.com") a proxy serves Codex under
+# when the scheme or host Django sees differs. DRF's SessionAuthentication
+# enforces CSRF on the API too, so this is the fix, not removing the middleware.
+CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS = list(
+    normalize_csrf_trusted_origins(
+        get_str_list(CODEX_CONFIG, "server.csrf_trusted_origins")
+    )
+)
 
 # Debug
 INTERNAL_IPS = ("127.0.0.1",)
diff --git a/codex/settings/codex.toml.default b/codex/settings/codex.toml.default
index 7e0e38f43..6eb7c0c3b 100644
--- a/codex/settings/codex.toml.default
+++ b/codex/settings/codex.toml.default
@@ -15,6 +15,10 @@
 # websockets = true
 # HTTP path prefix for codex (e.g. "/codex" for reverse proxy sub-path)
 # url_path_prefix = ""
+# Public origins accepted for CSRF when a reverse proxy serves Codex under
+# another scheme or host than Codex sees (e.g. https in front of http).
+# First make sure the proxy sends X-Forwarded-Proto and X-Forwarded-Host.
+# csrf_trusted_origins = ["https://comics.example.com"]
 # Worker threads that keep a warm database connection between requests.
 # Opening one costs a few milliseconds, mostly SQLite re-reading the
 # schema, so reusing them makes short requests noticeably cheaper. Each
diff --git a/codex/settings/config.py b/codex/settings/config.py
index f0258bfbb..6e6b102b3 100644
--- a/codex/settings/config.py
+++ b/codex/settings/config.py
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 import shutil
 import tomllib
-from collections.abc import Mapping, MutableMapping
+from collections.abc import Iterable, Mapping, MutableMapping
 from os import environ
 from pathlib import Path
 
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
     "GRANIAN_HTTP": "server.http",
     "GRANIAN_WEBSOCKETS": "server.websockets",
     "GRANIAN_URL_PATH_PREFIX": "server.url_path_prefix",
+    "CODEX_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS": "server.csrf_trusted_origins",
     # Logging
     "LOGLEVEL": "logging.loglevel",
     "CODEX_LOG_RETENTION": "logging.log_retention",
@@ -150,6 +151,33 @@ def normalize_url_path_prefix(prefix: str) -> str:
     return f"/{prefix}" if prefix else ""
 
 
+def normalize_csrf_trusted_origins(origins: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """
+    Normalize origins for Django's ``CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS``.
+
+    Django matches the ``Origin`` header against each entry by exact string,
+    or by subdomain for a ``https://*.example.com`` wildcard. A trailing slash
+    never matches, so it is stripped. An entry without a scheme can never
+    match either (and fails system check 4_0.E001), so it is dropped with a
+    warning. Duplicates are removed, keeping the first.
+    """
+    normalized: dict[str, None] = {}
+    for raw_origin in origins:
+        origin = raw_origin.rstrip("/")
+        if "://" not in origin:
+            reason = (
+                f"Ignoring server.csrf_trusted_origins entry {raw_origin!r}:"
+                " an origin has the form scheme://host[:port], e.g."
+                " https://comics.example.com. If CSRF 403s persist behind a"
+                " proxy, first check that it sends X-Forwarded-Proto and"
+                " X-Forwarded-Host."
+            )
+            logger.warning(reason)
+            continue
+        normalized[origin] = None
+    return tuple(normalized)
+
+
 def get_int(config: Mapping, keypath: str, default: int = 0) -> int:
     """Get an integer value from the config."""
     val = _deep_get(config, keypath, default)
@@ -172,3 +200,25 @@ def get_bool(config: Mapping, keypath: str, *, default: bool = False) -> bool:
     if isinstance(val, str):
         return val.lower() not in {"", "false", "0", "no"}
     return bool(val)
+
+
+def get_str_list(
+    config: Mapping, keypath: str, default: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """
+    Get a list of strings from the config.
+
+    TOML gives a native array; an env override gives one comma-separated
+    string. Items are stripped of whitespace and empty items are dropped.
+    """
+    val = _deep_get(config, keypath)
+    match val:
+        case None:
+            return default
+        case str():
+            items = val.split(",")
+        case list() | tuple():
+            items = val
+        case _:
+            items = (val,)
+    return tuple(item for raw in items if (item := str(raw).strip()))
diff --git a/tests/test_csrf_trusted_origins.py b/tests/test_csrf_trusted_origins.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23bc84bf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/test_csrf_trusted_origins.py
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+"""
+CSRF trusted origins.
+
+A reverse proxy that serves Codex under another scheme or host makes the
+browser's ``Origin`` header differ from the origin Django sees, so every
+unsafe API request fails the CSRF check with a 403. DRF's
+``SessionAuthentication`` enforces CSRF itself, so removing
+``CsrfViewMiddleware`` does not help. ``server.csrf_trusted_origins`` (or
+``CODEX_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS``) is read by :func:`get_str_list` and cleaned by
+:func:`normalize_csrf_trusted_origins` into Django's ``CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS``.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from contextlib import contextmanager
+from http import HTTPStatus
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Final, override
+
+import pytest
+from django.contrib.auth.models import User
+from django.test import Client, TestCase, override_settings
+from loguru import logger
+
+from codex.settings.config import (
+    _apply_env_overrides,
+    get_str_list,
+    normalize_csrf_trusted_origins,
+)
+from codex.startup import init_admin_flags
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from collections.abc import Generator, Mapping
+
+    from django.http import HttpResponse
+
+_TEST_PASSWORD: Final = "test-pw-hush-S106"  # noqa: S105
+_ENV_NAME: Final = "CODEX_CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS"
+_KEYPATH: Final = "server.csrf_trusted_origins"
+_ORIGIN_A: Final = "https://a.example.com"
+_ORIGIN_B: Final = "https://b.example.com"
+_PUBLIC_ORIGIN: Final = "https://comics.example.com"
+
+
+@contextmanager
+def _capture_logs() -> Generator[list[str]]:
+    """Collect loguru WARNING+ messages emitted inside the ``with`` block."""
+    records: list[str] = []
+    sink_id = logger.add(records.append, level="WARNING", format="{message}")
+    try:
+        yield records
+    finally:
+        logger.remove(sink_id)
+
+
+def _server(value) -> dict:
+    return {"server": {"csrf_trusted_origins": value}}
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("config", "expected"),
+    [
+        (_server([_ORIGIN_A, _ORIGIN_B]), (_ORIGIN_A, _ORIGIN_B)),
+        (_server(f"{_ORIGIN_A},{_ORIGIN_B}"), (_ORIGIN_A, _ORIGIN_B)),
+        (_server(f" {_ORIGIN_A} , {_ORIGIN_B} ,"), (_ORIGIN_A, _ORIGIN_B)),
+        (_server(""), ()),
+        (_server([]), ()),
+        (_server(None), ()),
+        ({"server": {}}, ()),
+    ],
+)
+def test_get_str_list(config: Mapping, expected: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+    """A TOML array or a comma string becomes a tuple of stripped items."""
+    assert get_str_list(config, _KEYPATH) == expected
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize(
+    ("raw", "expected"),
+    [
+        ((f"{_ORIGIN_A}/",), (_ORIGIN_A,)),
+        (("https://*.example.com",), ("https://*.example.com",)),
+        ((_ORIGIN_B, _ORIGIN_A, f"{_ORIGIN_B}/"), (_ORIGIN_B, _ORIGIN_A)),
+    ],
+)
+def test_normalize_csrf_trusted_origins(
+    raw: tuple[str, ...], expected: tuple[str, ...]
+) -> None:
+    """Trailing slashes go, wildcards stay, duplicates collapse in order."""
+    assert normalize_csrf_trusted_origins(raw) == expected
+
+
+def test_normalize_drops_schemeless_origin_with_warning() -> None:
+    """An entry without a scheme can never match, so it is dropped loudly."""
+    with _capture_logs() as records:
+        result = normalize_csrf_trusted_origins(("comics.example.com", _ORIGIN_A))
+    assert result == (_ORIGIN_A,)
+    assert len(records) == 1
+    assert "'comics.example.com'" in records[0]
+    assert "scheme://host[:port]" in records[0]
+
+
+def test_env_override_reaches_config(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    """The env var lands as the raw string and splits into origins."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv(_ENV_NAME, f"{_ORIGIN_A}, {_ORIGIN_B}")
+    config: dict = {}
+    _apply_env_overrides(config)
+    assert config["server"]["csrf_trusted_origins"] == f"{_ORIGIN_A}, {_ORIGIN_B}"
+    assert get_str_list(config, _KEYPATH) == (_ORIGIN_A, _ORIGIN_B)
+
+
+def test_env_override_beats_toml(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    """The env var replaces a TOML array, even when empty."""
+    config = _server([_PUBLIC_ORIGIN])
+    monkeypatch.setenv(_ENV_NAME, _ORIGIN_A)
+    _apply_env_overrides(config)
+    assert get_str_list(config, _KEYPATH) == (_ORIGIN_A,)
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv(_ENV_NAME, "")
+    _apply_env_overrides(config)
+    assert get_str_list(config, _KEYPATH) == ()
+
+
+class CsrfTrustedOriginsTestCase(TestCase):
+    """A proxied browser passes the API's CSRF check only for a trusted origin."""
+
+    @override
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        """Log in a CSRF-enforcing client and fetch its token."""
+        init_admin_flags()
+        User.objects.create_user(username="reader", password=_TEST_PASSWORD)
+        self.client = Client(enforce_csrf_checks=True)
+        self.client.login(username="reader", password=_TEST_PASSWORD)
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v4/auth/csrf")
+        self.token = response.json()["data"]["csrfToken"]  # pyright: ignore[reportUninitializedInstanceVariable]
+
+    def _put_timezone(self) -> HttpResponse:
+        # Django sees the internal http host; the browser saw the public
+        # https origin, as behind a proxy that forwards neither header.
+        return self.client.put(
+            "/api/v4/auth/timezone",
+            data={"timezone": "America/New_York"},
+            content_type="application/json",
+            HTTP_HOST="codex.internal",
+            HTTP_ORIGIN=_PUBLIC_ORIGIN,
+            HTTP_X_CSRFTOKEN=self.token,
+        )
+
+    def test_untrusted_origin_is_rejected(self) -> None:
+        """Without the setting the mismatched origin fails CSRF."""
+        response = self._put_timezone()
+        assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.FORBIDDEN
+        body = response.content.decode()
+        assert "CSRF Failed" in body
+        assert "Origin checking failed" in body
+
+    def test_trusted_origin_is_accepted(self) -> None:
+        """The same request passes once its origin is trusted."""
+        with override_settings(CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS=[_PUBLIC_ORIGIN]):
+            response = self._put_timezone()
+        assert response.status_code == HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT