diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index 8ee997a4d..0dfa3a589 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ jobs:
             echo
             echo "Commit: \`${{ github.sha }}\`  ·  srtool image: \`paritytech/srtool:1.81.0\`  ·  reproduce with the same commit and image."
             echo
+            echo "For \`parachainSystem.authorizeUpgrade\` use **\`blake2_256\`** below (the code hash the chain recomputes from the wasm at enactment); \`proposal_hash\` is the preimage hash of a \`system.setCode\` call and \`parachain_authorize_upgrade_hash\` is derived from the authorize call — neither is the value to authorize."
+            echo
             echo '```json'
             jq '.runtimes.compressed.subwasm // .' srtool-${{ steps.meta.outputs.chain }}.json
             echo '```'
diff --git a/docs/pen-migration-internal-review.md b/docs/pen-migration-internal-review.md
index 8d5e2b15d..ba18d429a 100644
--- a/docs/pen-migration-internal-review.md
+++ b/docs/pen-migration-internal-review.md
@@ -848,6 +848,29 @@ ships-paused with no storage written. **RB-5 passed 5/5**: the wasm written to
 attestor decoded post-upgrade blocks without a restart and rode a node
 restart. Dev-machine benchmark weights were accepted as production weights.
 
+### Published spec-26 artifact (2026-09-08)
+
+Built reproducibly by the new `Release Runtime` workflow (srtool v0.17.0,
+rustc 1.81.0) from the tagged commit `14eb720` and published as
+[pendulum-release-26](https://github.com/pendulum-chain/pendulum/releases/tag/pendulum-release-26)
+together with the srtool report. Verified locally: the downloaded wasm's
+sha256 equals the report's, and the embedded version is spec 26 /
+transaction_version 11.
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| `pendulum_runtime.compact.compressed.wasm` | 2,177,219 bytes |
+| sha256 | `370ac425e69125ac3d23971a1d2eba7966b15c7026621dd6a778c099432eb66d` |
+| blake2_256 (code hash) | `0x6a19a408826fb4d2ab04886c864714dda188df2a1bfa11f27b1b2d0c0192e896` |
+| democracy proposal hash | `0x830dd2349bf421f430b068e1361010b33dfaf8d38e8c9465cd95ee7cd378a0bf` |
+| `parachainSystem.authorizeUpgrade` hash | `0xf6cd1f4a600906a31f305ea0a8401ca31f84afa52b9fa31d31d35cde406b6ebf` |
+
+Against **this** binary — the thing to be shipped, not a local build — the
+fork reports spec 26, **phase 2 passed 14/14** and **RB-5 passed 5/5**.
+Anyone can reproduce the hashes from the same commit with
+`paritytech/srtool:1.81.0`. The referendum text should carry the code hash
+and the proposal hash above.
+
 ## Residual risks and standing practices (no external audit — risk accepted)
 - Every change to the fund-release path (vault release/approve/sweep logic,
   pallet burn path) gets a fresh independent adversarial review round before
diff --git a/docs/pen-migration-runbooks.md b/docs/pen-migration-runbooks.md
index 34ffec5e4..a7dfab676 100644
--- a/docs/pen-migration-runbooks.md
+++ b/docs/pen-migration-runbooks.md
@@ -154,12 +154,32 @@ Before the upgrade is enacted:
    migration touching `NextNonce` storage must preserve it; reject one that
    doesn't.
 
-After enactment:
-4. Watch the fleet: all four daemons progressing past the upgrade block, test
-   migration of a small amount end-to-end, monitor `ok` lines resuming.
-5. If daemons exit on the upgrade block: they hold position (checkpoint stays
+When the referendum enacts (`parachainSystem.authorizeUpgrade(code_hash,
+check_version = true)` executes — this only *authorizes* the hash):
+4. **Enact it.** Anyone submits `parachainSystem.enactAuthorizedUpgrade(code)`
+   with the full published wasm (`pendulum_runtime.compact.compressed.wasm`
+   from the GitHub release, ~2.2 MB; the length fee is well under 1 PEN). The
+   call verifies `blake2_256(code)` against the authorized hash and, with
+   `check_version`, that the new `spec_version` is higher; it then signals the
+   upgrade to the relay chain, which applies it after its validation delay.
+   Nothing happens until this call is sent. Verify afterwards:
+   `system.lastRuntimeUpgrade` reports the new spec, `tokenMigration.paused()`
+   is `true`, and `parachainSystem.authorizedUpgrade` is cleared.
+5. Reclaim the preimage deposit: `preimage.unnotePreimage(hash)` from the
+   account that noted it (the deposit is returned once the preimage is unused).
+6. Watch the fleet: all four daemons progressing past the upgrade block, test
+   migration of a small amount end-to-end (only after the governance unpause),
+   monitor `ok` lines resuming.
+7. If daemons exit on the upgrade block: they hold position (checkpoint stays
    put) — fix decoding, redeploy, they resume without loss.
 
+**Which hash goes where.** The release's srtool report lists several hashes.
+`parachainSystem.authorizeUpgrade` takes the **code hash** — `blake2_256` of
+the wasm file (the value `enactAuthorizedUpgrade` recomputes from the bytes).
+The report's `proposal_hash` is the preimage hash of a `system.setCode` call
+and its `parachain_authorize_upgrade_hash` is derived from the authorize
+*call*; neither is what the pallet checks at enactment.
+
 ## RB-7: Window close and remainder sweep
 
 **Trigger:** the migration window is closing (per decision D5) and governance