diff --git a/docs/specs/2026-09-14-v5-data-platform-design.md b/docs/specs/2026-09-14-v5-data-platform-design.md
index 35f3bc8..fc74715 100644
--- a/docs/specs/2026-09-14-v5-data-platform-design.md
+++ b/docs/specs/2026-09-14-v5-data-platform-design.md
@@ -1361,3 +1361,38 @@ permission, so an anonymous caller can make the server read up to 18 MB before i
 stored and no URL is returned, and the 15/min-per-IP limiter is what bounds it.
 
 **Status.** Accepted. §3.4 is no longer open.
+
+### 2026-09-22 — `AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS`, so the domain rule cannot become a lock-out
+
+**A new environment variable: `AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS`**, a comma-separated list of full addresses
+allowed to sign in whatever domain they are on. Empty by default, and empty in the Cornell Tech
+deployment, where it changes nothing.
+
+**Why.** §3.4's domain rule is right for a university — it admits every student without anybody
+maintaining a roster — but it ties every account to one institution's Google Workspace, including
+the accounts that must never be locked out. The people who hold `super_admin` are exactly the ones
+whose institutional address is temporary: a director who graduates, a maintainer after the project
+leaves Cornell, a handover to somebody who does not have a `cornell.edu` address yet. The
+super-admin floor was built to make lock-out unrecoverable-proof, but `isSuperAdminFloor` calls
+`isAllowedEmail` first, so a floor entry on any other domain was **silently ignored** — the
+env var would look set and do nothing, which is the worst shape a safety net can have.
+
+**Named exceptions, never a second open domain.** `isAllowedEmail` now passes an address on the
+configured domain **or** one named in the list. Adding an entry is a deliberate act by somebody who
+can already deploy, and it admits exactly one person, not a provider. `AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAIN`
+keeps doing all the work for everybody else.
+
+**One consequence worth stating plainly: setting this drops the Google `hd` hint.** `hd` is not only
+a hint to the account picker — Better Auth verifies the claim on the returned id token, and a
+personal Google account carries no `hd` at all. Left on, it would refuse every named exception
+before this app's own check ran. So `socialProviders.google.hd` is omitted whenever the list is
+non-empty. The picker gets wider; the two server-side enforcement points in §3.4 do not move, and
+they are the control. A deployment that leaves the list empty is byte-identical to before.
+
+**The bootstrap, decided 2026-09-22.** `AUTH_SUPER_ADMIN_EMAILS=ies22@cornell.edu` remains the
+floor for launch — it works today with no code change. `steinbergisaac@gmail.com` goes in
+`AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS`, and may be added to the floor, so access survives the Cornell account.
+
+**Status.** Accepted. Tested in `roles.test.ts`: an off-domain named address is admitted, its
+domain is **not** opened to anybody else, the institutional domain keeps working alongside it, and
+an empty list behaves exactly as the domain rule did.
diff --git a/v5/.env.example b/v5/.env.example
index a8a05e1..a1b9ded 100644
--- a/v5/.env.example
+++ b/v5/.env.example
@@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ AUTH_BASE_URL=http://localhost:3000
 # also sent to Google as the `hd` hint, which only narrows the account picker.
 AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAIL_DOMAIN=cornell.edu
 
+# Addresses allowed in BY NAME, whatever domain they are on — comma-separated.
+# Named exceptions, never a second open domain: for a maintainer or a director
+# whose institutional account is temporary. Setting any value here drops the
+# Google `hd` hint, because Better Auth verifies that claim and a personal
+# account carries none. Empty (the Cornell Tech deployment's setting) leaves
+# the domain rule exactly as it was.
+AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS=
+
 # The super-admin FLOOR — comma-separated addresses. Not a roster: everyone
 # else's role is the `user.role` column, changed on /admin/users.
 #
diff --git a/v5/src/lib/auth/config.ts b/v5/src/lib/auth/config.ts
index ba7c5e7..f11f98a 100644
--- a/v5/src/lib/auth/config.ts
+++ b/v5/src/lib/auth/config.ts
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ import { admin } from "better-auth/plugins/admin";
 import { dataSubstrate, getDb } from "../db/client";
 import * as schema from "../db/schema/index";
 import { ac, roles } from "./permissions";
-import { allowedEmailDomain, isAllowedEmail } from "./roles";
+import { allowedEmailDomain, allowedEmails, isAllowedEmail } from "./roles";
 import { isSuperAdminFloor } from "./super-admins";
 import type { Db } from "../db/types";
 
@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ export async function getAuth(): Promise<AuthInstance | null> {
 export function createAuth(db: Db) {
   const secret = process.env.AUTH_SECRET || "";
   const domain = allowedEmailDomain();
+  const namedExceptions = allowedEmails().length > 0;
 
   return betterAuth({
     secret,
@@ -119,7 +120,15 @@ export function createAuth(db: Db) {
             clientId: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID || "",
             clientSecret: process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET || "",
             // UI hint + Better Auth's `hd` claim check. Not the control.
-            hd: domain,
+            //
+            // Dropped entirely once AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS names anybody, because
+            // `hd` is not only a hint to Google: Better Auth verifies the claim
+            // on the returned id token, and a personal account carries no `hd`
+            // at all. Left on, it would refuse every named exception before
+            // this app's own check ran — the allowlist would look configured
+            // and do nothing. The picker gets wider; the two enforcement
+            // points below do not move.
+            ...(namedExceptions ? {} : { hd: domain }),
           },
         }
       : {},
diff --git a/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.test.ts b/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.test.ts
index 8d90c1a..8e1e0ce 100644
--- a/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.test.ts
+++ b/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.test.ts
@@ -72,6 +72,29 @@ describe("isAllowedEmail", () => {
     expect(isAllowedEmail("someone@mail.cornell.edu")).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  it("accepts an address named in AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS, off-domain", () => {
+    vi.stubEnv("AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS", "steinbergisaac@gmail.com");
+    expect(isAllowedEmail("steinbergisaac@gmail.com")).toBe(true);
+    // Normalized on both sides, like every other address in this module.
+    expect(isAllowedEmail("  SteinbergIsaac@Gmail.com ")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("does not open the named address's domain to anybody else", () => {
+    // The whole point: exceptions are addresses, never domains.
+    vi.stubEnv("AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS", "steinbergisaac@gmail.com");
+    expect(isAllowedEmail("someone.else@gmail.com")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps accepting the institutional domain alongside the exceptions", () => {
+    vi.stubEnv("AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS", "steinbergisaac@gmail.com");
+    expect(isAllowedEmail("abc123@cornell.edu")).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it("changes nothing when the list is empty or unset", () => {
+    vi.stubEnv("AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS", "");
+    expect(isAllowedEmail("someone@gmail.com")).toBe(false);
+  });
+
   it("rejects null, undefined, and empty input", () => {
     expect(isAllowedEmail(null)).toBe(false);
     expect(isAllowedEmail(undefined)).toBe(false);
diff --git a/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.ts b/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.ts
index e740c4a..922e248 100644
--- a/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.ts
+++ b/v5/src/lib/auth/roles.ts
@@ -65,14 +65,37 @@ export function allowedEmailDomain(): string {
 }
 
 /**
- * Server-side domain check. Google's `hd` parameter narrows the account picker
- * and is a **UI hint, not a security control** — this is the enforcement, and it
- * runs again on every request that resolves an identity.
+ * Addresses allowed in by name, whatever domain they are on.
+ *
+ * The domain rule is the right control for a university: it admits every
+ * student without anybody maintaining a list. But it ties the app to one
+ * institution's Google Workspace, and the people who must never be locked out
+ * are exactly the ones whose institutional account is temporary — a director
+ * who graduates, a handover to somebody who does not have a `cornell.edu`
+ * address yet, a maintainer after the project leaves the university.
+ *
+ * So: named exceptions, never a second open domain. Each entry is one full
+ * address, and adding one is a deliberate act by somebody who can already
+ * deploy. An empty list — the default, and the Cornell Tech deployment's
+ * setting — leaves the domain rule exactly as it was.
+ */
+export function allowedEmails(): string[] {
+  return parseEmailList(process.env.AUTH_ALLOWED_EMAILS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Server-side sign-in check: on the institution's domain, or named in
+ * {@link allowedEmails}.
+ *
+ * Google's `hd` parameter narrows the account picker and is a **UI hint, not a
+ * security control** — this is the enforcement, and it runs again on every
+ * request that resolves an identity.
  */
 export function isAllowedEmail(email: string | null | undefined): boolean {
   const normalized = normalizeEmail(email);
   if (!normalized) return false;
-  return normalized.endsWith(`@${allowedEmailDomain()}`);
+  if (normalized.endsWith(`@${allowedEmailDomain()}`)) return true;
+  return allowedEmails().includes(normalized);
 }
 
 /** Lower-case and trim an address; returns "" for anything unusable. */