diff --git a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
index 2711418..4e5788a 100644
--- a/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
+++ b/.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
@@ -13,27 +13,19 @@ Closes #
 
 ## Changes
 
-## Verification
+## Validation
 
 <!-- Record what you actually ran, so a reviewer can tell verified from
      assumed. -->
 
-| Command | Environment | Result |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `make check-all` |  |  |
-| `make build` |  |  |
+<!-- Include command, environment and outcome (including the exact pytest summary).
+     Remove unused prompts; do not claim unrun checks passed. -->
 
 <!-- `check-all` does not build the distribution, so it can pass while the
      packaged artifact is broken. Run `make build` as well. -->
 
-## Not run
-
-<!-- Checks you did not run, and why. Leave this honest rather than empty. -->
-
-## Compatibility and documentation
-
-- [ ] This change affects the public API, supported versions, or output format
-- [ ] Documentation updated, or not needed because:
+<!-- State significant checks not run and compatibility/documentation changes
+     when relevant, rather than adding empty checklist sections. -->
 
 <!-- Version selection, tags, publication and repository labels are the
      release owner's, not yours. CHANGELOG.md is generated; write a good
diff --git a/docs/review-evidence-policy.md b/docs/review-evidence-policy.md
index 6e148ff..741cad4 100644
--- a/docs/review-evidence-policy.md
+++ b/docs/review-evidence-policy.md
@@ -1,140 +1,77 @@
-# Review Evidence Policy (advisory)
-
-> **Status: advisory, not server-enforced.** Nothing in this document is a required status
-> check. Branch protection on `main` still gates only on the five required contexts
-> (`ci-required`, `bandit`, `semgrep`, `Analyze`, `PR title`), strict mode, and conversation
-> resolution — see [#459's final decision](https://github.com/yeongseon/azure-functions-logging-python/issues/459#issuecomment-5963270562).
-> This policy defines what review *evidence* a maintainer should record before merging; it does
-> not add a required check, and must not be treated as one until a trusted verdict publisher is
-> configured and verified in this repository (see "Rollout" below).
-
-This repository runs with **zero required native GitHub approvals** (#459) because the sole
-maintainer cannot approve their own PR, and a review requirement would block every PR. Independent
-review still happens — Copilot code review, or a human — but nothing previously recorded *who*
-reviewed *which commit*, *what* was found, or whether findings were resolved before merge. The
-existing PR template's **Verification** and **Not run** sections already record command/
-environment/result evidence; this document adds the reviewer-identity and findings-disposition
-record those sections don't cover. It does **not** reopen #459 (zero native approvals stands) and
-does **not** replace CI.
-
-## Roles
-
-- **Implementer** — the person or agent that authored the change (may be the maintainer).
-- **Independent reviewer** — a review source distinct from the implementer: GitHub Copilot code
-  review, or a human maintainer/contributor who did not author the diff. A review is only
-  independent evidence if it evaluates the PR's **current head commit**; a thread opened against
-  an earlier commit is stale once the diff changes (see "SHA binding" below).
-
-Implementer-managed helper reviews (e.g. an agent re-running its own linter and calling the result
-a "review") are supplemental context, not independent review evidence. A checklist, comment state,
-or reaction alone is insufficient.
-
-## SHA binding (why this matters)
-
-A review is evidence for the commit it evaluated — never for the PR as a whole:
-
-- Use the **formal review's reviewed commit** (`reviews[].commit_id` via the GitHub API), not an
-  inline comment's current `commit_id`. GitHub can re-target an inline comment's `commit_id` to the
-  latest push even when the comment's `original_commit_id` still names the commit it was actually
-  left against.
-- A reply to an existing review thread — including one authored by the PR's own implementer — is
-  not a new independent review of the diff, even when it is the most recent activity on the final
-  head.
-- Any push after a review invalidates that review's evidence for the new head.
-
-## Review effort
-
-Seek additional review when risk or unresolved findings justify it, without a mandatory number of AI review rounds. Maintain explicit human review for high-risk changes.
-
-## What to record per PR
-
-For routine PRs, record a short summary, key changes, actual validation, and related issues. State significant findings and blockers when relevant. Do not require risk tiers, evidence placeholders, or agent process logs on ordinary PRs.
-
-For changes in the high-risk R3 scope below, additionally record the reviewed commit, material findings, and explicit maintainer authorization. This evidence can be a short dedicated section; AI review does not itself establish human approval.
-
-- For changes to Logging's public contracts specifically: invocation/context isolation across
-  concurrent work and generator lifetimes, handler-local record mutation (`IsolatedHandler`),
-  structured output and redaction, sanitized exception diagnostics, Azure worker handler ownership,
-  or opt-in OpenTelemetry correlation — which contract is touched, and the test(s) that exercise
-  it. Evidence here can be local and use dummy/synthetic sensitive values; live telemetry ingestion
-  or publication is a separate claim this policy does not make.
-
-External contributors may use ordinary human review without subscriptions or AI tooling.
-
-## R3 scope
-
-Treat the following as higher-risk ("R3") and require an explicit human maintainer authorization
-record tied to the reviewed commit, in addition to any automated review:
-
-- Workflow permissions (`permissions:` blocks, `GITHUB_TOKEN` scope, secrets usage).
-- Release/publishing configuration (`publish-pypi.yml`, `release-please.yml`, PyPI Trusted
-  Publishing config).
-- Security-sensitive redaction or log/exception-disclosure behavior (`_redaction.py`,
-  `_filters.py`'s `RedactionFilter`/`AttributeFlattenFilter`, `_isolated_handler.py`, and anything
-  touching what reaches a sink from `extra=` payloads or `exc_info`).
-- Telemetry trust boundaries — what context/trace data crosses into OpenTelemetry or Application
-  Insights (`_otel.py`, `_host_config.py`'s OTel detection).
-- Review policy or evaluator configuration itself — changes to this document, reviewer allowlists,
-  or `CODEOWNERS` if introduced.
-- Policy-bearing files generally: `AGENTS.md`, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `SECURITY.md`,
-  `docs/agent-playbook.md`, `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md`, this document.
-
-An account token, an automatically posted comment, the merge actor, or a successful CI run does
-not by itself prove a human authorized an R3 change — record who actually made the call, on which
-commit, and why.
-
-## Exceptions (explicit policy cases)
-
-These are documented **exceptions**, not instances of independent review — they remain visible as
-exceptions in PR history rather than being recorded as if a review had occurred:
-
-- **Release Please** PRs: version/changelog-only; mechanical, not independently reviewed.
-- **Dependabot `pip` patch/minor**: auto-merged on green required CI; the full test matrix is the
-  evidence. Note the auto-merge workflow uses `secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN`, which cannot itself approve a
-  PR (#459) — auto-merge here relies on the zero-required-approvals policy, not on the token
-  granting approval.
-- **GitHub Actions SHA updates**: require a human diff check confirming the pinned SHA matches its
-  claimed tag. This human check *is* the review evidence — record the SHA/tag comparison
-  performed.
-- **Forks**: external PRs are reviewed by a maintainer before merge; Copilot review may be
-  unavailable or restricted on fork PRs depending on repository settings — record "unavailable"
-  explicitly rather than silently skipping the field.
-- **Reviewer outages / emergencies**: if Copilot review is unavailable (quota, outage, provider
-  error), record the unavailability and fall back to human review before merge.
-
-## Provenance pitfalls (do not accept as evidence)
-
-- A bot `COMMENTED` or `APPROVED` state alone does not prove independent human authorization —
-  check reviewer identity/type, not just the review state.
-- A shared GitHub Actions app ID (15368, observed across sampled PRs #575/#573/#572) is not
-  sufficient to identify the trusted evaluator: any PR-controlled workflow can emit a result under
-  the same app ID. Verdict-publisher identity must be resolved before any such result is treated as
-  enforced evidence (see "Rollout").
-- An unknown or missing response must never default to "approved" — treat it as "evidence absent."
-- A resolved review thread does not establish the findings were addressed on the *current* head if
-  the thread's reviewed commit predates later pushes.
-
-## Rollout
-
-This policy begins **advisory-only**. Before any of it becomes a required, server-enforced check:
-
-1. The verdict-publisher's identity must be independently resolved (not just a shared app ID) and
-   documented.
-2. The exact required-check binding (context name + trusted publisher) must be configured and
-   verified against this repository's branch protection (full protection reads returned HTTP 403
-   in the reviewed pass — re-verify before relying on any cached assumption about current
-   settings).
-3. Administrator/emergency bypass boundaries for that check must be documented alongside the
-   existing `enforce_admins=false` emergency-bypass policy.
-
-Until all three are done, nothing in this document overrides or supersedes the required CI
-contexts, strict mode, and conversation-resolution policy already enforced on `main`.
-
-## Related work
-
-- [#459](https://github.com/yeongseon/azure-functions-logging-python/issues/459) — the
-  zero-native-approval decision this policy builds on, not reopens.
-- [#463](https://github.com/yeongseon/azure-functions-logging-python/issues/463) — prior,
-  completed contributor/template cleanup.
-- [#557](https://github.com/yeongseon/azure-functions-logging-python/issues/557) — prior,
-  completed runtime/release tracker; not reopened by this policy.
+# Review and merge evidence
+
+This is the single source for review records. It adds no workflow, reviewer bot,
+paid-tool requirement or required status check. AI feedback is advice, never
+human approval or proof that tests ran.
+
+## Every change
+
+1. Describe the change and link its tracking issue. Record commands actually run,
+   their environment/results, and material checks not run in the PR's Validation
+   section. Do not add empty evidence fields or mandatory AI review rounds.
+2. Read the current diff for correctness, compatibility, maintainability and
+   security. Evaluate findings against the code; fix valid findings or explain
+   their disposition, and resolve review conversations.
+3. Before merging, confirm the required contexts (`bandit`, `semgrep`, `Analyze`,
+   `PR title`, `ci-required`) pass on the exact current head, with the branch
+   up to date and all conversations resolved. A review of an older commit is
+   evidence only for that older commit; review substantive changes made since it.
+4. Record the responsible maintainer's merge decision. Zero required GitHub
+   approvals allows a sole maintainer to merge; it does not make an AI review
+   a human approval or permit bypassing CI.
+
+External contributors can follow this procedure using ordinary human review and
+GitHub CI; no subscription or local review agent is necessary.
+
+## Security-sensitive and policy changes
+
+Additionally record the reviewed head SHA, material findings/dispositions, the
+affected contract and relevant tests, and explicit maintainer authorization.
+This applies to credentials, permissions, release/publishing, redaction and
+exception disclosure, handler ownership/mutation, concurrent invocation context
+isolation, telemetry trust boundaries, and repository policy changes.
+
+A token, bot review state, merge actor or successful CI run alone is not evidence
+of human authorization. State who authorized the change and why. Synthetic local
+tests may establish a logging contract; they do not establish live ingestion or
+Azure certification. Obtain further review when unresolved risk warrants it,
+not to satisfy a fixed number of AI rounds.
+
+## Compact PR examples
+
+Routine change:
+
+```text
+Summary: clarify exporter-first setup; no runtime change.
+Validation: make check-all and make build passed on Python 3.11; exact test
+summary recorded. Live Azure ingestion not run (documentation-only change).
+Related Issues: Closes #N
+Merge decision: maintainer accepted the current diff with required CI green.
+```
+
+Security-sensitive change adds only the relevant detail:
+
+```text
+Review: head <SHA>; protects exception diagnostics before sink translation.
+Finding: raw cached traceback could bypass masking; fixed and covered by the
+downstream synthetic-canary regression. No unresolved findings.
+Authorization: <maintainer> explicitly authorized this reviewed change because
+the disclosure regression is fixed; exact-head required CI is green.
+```
+
+## Automated and dependency PRs
+
+- Pip patch/minor Dependabot updates may auto-merge after required CI passes;
+  AI review is not a prerequisite. Major updates need a compatibility decision.
+- GitHub Actions updates never auto-merge: review the version-only diff, compare
+  each pinned SHA with its claimed tag (dereference annotated tags), and record
+  the comparison before merging.
+- Release Please version/changelog PRs follow the release process and existing
+  release gates. A mechanical diff is not a claim of independent review.
+- A maintainer reviews externally authored PRs before merge. If an optional AI
+  reviewer is unavailable, ordinary human review remains sufficient; no empty
+  outage/provenance form is required.
+
+Branch protection and the release/security safeguards remain unchanged. Nothing
+here introduces an evaluator publisher, relaxes a required check, or authorizes
+an administrator bypass.