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Use one shared consent field on all websites and validate it before both password and verify-email signup. Classify validated invitation/reset tokens on the server and prevent invitations from bypassing signup via the reset URL. Record accepted consent on the actual signup partner before queuing its replacement, preserve existing consent dates, and carry consent across partner replacement. Keep backend and OAuth signup independent of website consent. Add HTTP and model regression coverage, complete consent translations, and bump the module to 18.0.1.0.34. Assisted-by: gpt-6.1-sol, high, codex
The verify-email handler forwards request.params directly into privileged signup, so submitted partner or user fields can set or overwrite consent dates before the model's preservation guard runs. After validating consent, expose only login/name from qcontext and the token/redirect plumbing to the upstream handler. Preserve the reCAPTCHA token for its verifier to consume and restore request params afterward. Email is derived from login; consent dates come only from the server context. Add HTTP regressions for forged consent dates on tokenless and invited signup, extra partner fields, and preserved CAPTCHA verification. The three injection regressions fail on 256de19 and all 19 consent tests pass with the allowlist. The full suite adds no unrelated failures. Assisted-by: gpt-6.1-sol, high, codex
Sites without a separate terms URL use the combined legal-terms label. Select the refusal message from the same website terms_url branch so its wording matches the checkbox for both password and passwordless signup. Translate the legal-terms error in French, German, Italian and Polish using the existing acceptance_full terminology. Cover both website configurations and signup paths over HTTP; all 20 consent tests pass. Assisted-by: gpt-6.1-sol, high, codex
NoeBerdoz
requested review from
Danielgergely and
davidwul
and removed request for
Danielgergely
November 5, 2026 15:00
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The Polish website's
/web/signuphad no consent checkbox: the checkbox views were bound to the Swiss main website (signup_sponsor) and to the Swiss my2 website (my2_signup_fields), so every other website rendered the stock form. Meanwhile_signup_with_valuesrecordedlegal_agreement_dateon every signup, on any website, so a PL signup stored an agreement nobody was shown. Found while reviewing #443 and CompassionCH/tools#31.What changes (my_compassion only)
auth_signup.fieldsrenders one requiredprivacy_policycheckbox (labelacceptance_full) when the server says consent is required. The two website-bound checkbox blocks are removed; their styling and password icons stay.legal_agreement_date. Never on a password reset. An invitation token opened through/web/reset_passwordis sent to/web/signup(GET) or refused (POST), so it cannot skip consent.do_signup) and the verify-email passwordless form (auth_signup_verify_email), which goes straight tores.users.signup(). Withoutprivacy_policy=accepted, no account is created and a translated error is shown, worded like the label (terms and conditions when the website has a terms URL, legal terms otherwise). The passwordless path no longer creates accounts on GET and forwards onlylogin,nameand the token/redirect/reCAPTCHA plumbing to the upstream handler, so a postedlegal_agreement_dateor other partner field is ignored._find_and_replace_partner_async) replaces the signup partner, which lost it before. OAuth and backend calls tosignup()are unchanged and record nothing.Tests
tests/test_signup_consent.py, 20 tests: one checkbox on the Swiss main, my2 and a second MyCompassion website; both signup paths refused without consent (error wording with and without a terms URL) and accepted with it; invitations with and without a date, password reset, invalid token, invitation through the reset page; date kept across partner replacement; forged dates and extra fields on the passwordless form; direct backendsignup(). The refusal, replacement, forged-field and wording tests fail without their fix. The rest of themy_compassionsuite on a fresh database shows the same failures as origin/18.0 (no child, inactive payment methods), none new.Deploy
-u my_compassion. Before or after: check that no website keeps a builder-edited copy ofauth_signup.fields,auth_signup.signup,my_compassion.signup_sponsorormy_compassion.my2_signup_fields, and that each website's terms and privacy URLs resolve (/legal,/legal/terms).Not in this PR
legal_agreement_datedoes not say which website or which version of the texts was accepted.