fix(oauth2): close id_token_hint auth bypass and login-loop regression - #158
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Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
…t failure An id_token_hint built as an UnsecuredJWT (alg=none) is neither IJWE nor IJWS, so it skipped the whole signature-verification block and fell straight through to trusting its sub/jti unconditionally. Combined with the reload-session fallback that authenticates by user_id when the session can't be resumed, this let anyone forge an unsigned id_token_hint and get logged in as an arbitrary user_id with no credentials. Now any hint that isn't a verified IJWS is rejected before sub/jti are read. Separately, the id_token_hint param was only marked as processed after a successful reloadSession(). A hint that fails (stale, wrong audience, expired) never got marked, so every subsequent resume of the pending OAuth2 memento reprocessed the same hint, failed again, and logged the user back out - including right after a successful password login redirects back to /oauth2/auth. That turned any invalid hint into a login loop with no way out short of clearing site data. The param is now marked processed as soon as hint processing begins, so a failed hint is retried at most once per attempt. Full test suite green (244 tests, 1173 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
Adds two unit tests for the fix in e913375: - testProcessUserHintRejectsUnsignedAlgNoneIdTokenHint: builds a real, parseable alg=none id_token_hint (RFC 7519 unsecured JWT) and asserts its forged sub/jti never reach unwrapUserId/getUserById/reloadSession. Fails against the pre-fix code with a TypeError from getUserById receiving the forged sub unchecked, proving the hint used to be trusted before any signature check. - testFailedIdTokenHintIsMarkedProcessedToPreventLoginLoop: asserts the id_token_hint param is marked processed on the request object even when hint processing fails. Fails against the pre-fix code (flag stays false), proving a failed hint used to be retried - and fail, and log the user out - on every resume of the pending OAuth2 memento. Both verified red against the parent commit and green against the fix. Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
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Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 1 included review per hour; 0 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe change introduces capability-limited session reload hints. Interactive login hints now require valid signatures and claims, reject expired tokens, prevent retry loops, and allow subject fallback only for server-signed hints with attested authentication time. ChangesSession reload and login hint flow
Priority: ⬆️ High Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested reviewers: Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant InteractiveGrantType
participant TokenVerifier
participant SessionReloadHint
participant AuthService
participant Session
InteractiveGrantType->>InteractiveGrantType: Mark id_token_hint as processed
InteractiveGrantType->>TokenVerifier: Verify signature and claims
TokenVerifier-->>InteractiveGrantType: Return validated claims
InteractiveGrantType->>SessionReloadHint: Create reload capability
InteractiveGrantType->>AuthService: reloadSession(SessionReloadHint)
AuthService->>Session: Restore cached session or register fallback principal
AuthService-->>InteractiveGrantType: Complete reload or throw
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to No actionable merge-blocking risk is established. The session reload and login-hint changes appear mergeable with normal checks. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
In `@app/libs/Auth/AuthService.php`:
- Around line 717-723: Update the ReloadSessionException catch flow in
reloadSession so it returns immediately after a successful fallback
Auth::login($user), and rethrows $ex when $user_id is null; preserve the
existing missing-user exception behavior.
- Line 713: Add a \Throwable catch after the existing ReloadSessionException
handler in reloadSession() to restore the former session via former_session_id,
restart it, and rethrow the original error; preserve the existing fallback login
logic within the ReloadSessionException restoration path.
- Line 686: Update both fallback authentication branches in AuthService so the
user retrieved by getUserById is rejected when null or when canLogin() returns
false before either Auth::login call; preserve the existing
ReloadSessionException behavior.
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app/libs/Auth/AuthService.phpapp/libs/OAuth2/GrantTypes/InteractiveGrantType.phpapp/libs/Utils/Services/IAuthService.phptests/unit/InteractiveGrantTypeTest.php
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Addresses 3 CodeRabbit findings on PR #158: - Both fallback Auth::login() calls (empty-cache and post-catch) only checked is_null($user), not $user->canLogin(). getUserById() doesn't filter by account status, so a locked/deactivated/unverified user with a still-valid id_token_hint could bypass the lock via this path, unlike every other login entry point in this file which already gates on canLogin(). - The ReloadSessionException catch block returned normally (no throw) when $user_id was null, silently swallowing a real reload failure and violating the method's own \@throws contract. It now returns only after a successful fallback login, and rethrows otherwise. - Added a \Throwable catch alongside the existing ReloadSessionException one: a DB error inside getUserById() (not a ReloadSessionException) previously escaped uncaught, leaving the caller's session pointed at the swapped-in (possibly stale) session id instead of being restored - the same collateral-damage bug this PR set out to fix, via a different exception type. Full suite green (246 tests, 1176 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
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Copilot review overview
🟡 Changes recommended
The fallback does not validate standard token claims and does not register principal authentication state before login.
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What changed in this PR
Fixes OIDC id_token_hint authentication bypass and login-loop behavior.
Changes:
- Rejects unsigned hints and marks failed hints as processed.
- Adds session restoration and subject-based fallback authentication.
- Expands regression test coverage.
| File | Summary |
|---|---|
tests/unit/InteractiveGrantTypeTest.php |
Adds regression tests for unsigned and repeated hints. |
app/libs/Utils/Services/IAuthService.php |
Extends the session reload contract. |
app/libs/OAuth2/GrantTypes/InteractiveGrantType.php |
Validates signed hints and forwards the subject. |
app/libs/Auth/AuthService.php |
Adds fallback authentication and session restoration; unresolved claim-validation and principal-registration findings remain. |
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…ipal Addresses the remaining findings on PR #158 (Copilot review): - processUserHint() now rejects an id_token_hint whose exp has passed, right after signature verification. A verified signature only proves who issued the token, not that it's still inside its validity window - the jti cache TTL mirrors the token's lifetime but isn't a reliable substitute for checking exp directly (eviction timing, clock skew). Deliberately NOT validating aud: this hint is the SSO mechanism between different clients of this IDP (client A -> client B), so the token's original audience is expected to differ from the client presenting it. - Both reloadSession() fallback Auth::login() calls now pair with principal_service->clear()+register(), matching every other login entry point in AuthService. Auth::login() alone left the IDP's own principal state (user_id/auth_time/op_browser_state) unset even though Auth::check() would report the user as logged in. Tests: - tests/AuthServiceReloadSessionTest.php (new): unit-tests reloadSession directly (facade-mocked, no DB) for canLogin() enforcement, principal registration on both fallback paths, the \Throwable session-restore path, and the no-fallback-user_id rethrow. - OIDCColdSessionReloadTest::testColdSessionRejectsExpiredIdTokenHint: real end-to-end test with an actually-expired, correctly-signed token (via a configurable near-zero id_token lifetime + sleep, no hand-forged signature). - Both new test groups verified red against the pre-fix code, green against the fix. Full suite green (253 tests, 1250 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 2
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
🤖 Prompt to fix review comments
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Inline comments:
In `@app/libs/OAuth2/GrantTypes/InteractiveGrantType.php`:
- Line 579: In the verified claim handling around getSubject(), validate that
the returned subject is non-null before calling getString(). Throw
InvalidLoginHint for a missing subject so it follows the existing
invalid-login-hint handling instead of dereferencing null.
- Line 574: Update the expiration check in the id_token_hint validation flow to
reject timestamps equal to or earlier than the current time, not only strictly
earlier values. Replace the strict expiration comparison around expiration_time
with the inverse current-time comparison, preserving the null-expiration
rejection and preventing reloadSession() for the boundary case.
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reloadSession()'s sub-based fallback (login by user_id when the hint's jti is no longer cached) was offered for any id_token_hint whose signature verified, including one verified with a key the client controls: an HS* client secret, a public key the client registered, or its jwks_uri. Such a signature proves the client made the token, not the IDP, so a client operator could mint a hint naming an arbitrary user id and obtain a session for it once the jti lookup missed. processUserHint now tracks whether the signature was verified with the server's own signing key and passes user_id to reloadSession() only in that case. Client-key-verified hints keep the jti-only semantics. Tests: - unit: a client-secret-signed hint reaches reloadSession() with a null user_id; a server-key-signed hint still carries the resolved user_id - e2e: a hint signed with the seeded client's HS512 secret and an unknown jti lands on /auth/login with no authenticated user (was: logged in and sent to consent)
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Two claim-validation gaps on a verified id_token_hint: - exp: NumericDate::isBefore() is a strict `<`, so a hint whose exp equals the current second passed the expiry check. RFC 7519 §4.1.4 requires the current time to be strictly before exp; the guard is now `!$expiration_time->isAfter(NumericDate::now())`. - sub: a hint without a sub claim dereferenced null (`$sub->getString()`), raising an Error that the Exception-only catch in mustAuthenticateUser() does not handle, so the request 500'd instead of falling through to the login redirect. Added the same null guard jti and exp already have. Tests (unit, InteractiveGrantTypeTest): a hint with exp = now and a hint without sub are both rejected before reloadSession() and end at the login page.
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The sub-based fallback in AuthService::reloadSession() registered the IDP principal with time(), although the user did not authenticate on that request: they authenticated when the IDP issued the hint. That made shouldForceReLogin() treat a stale authentication as fresh and stamped a false auth_time into the next id_token. reloadSession() now takes an optional auth_time and registers it in both fallback branches (time() stays only as a safety net). InteractiveGrantType::processUserHint() resolves it from the hint's auth_time claim, else its iat, and degrades a server-signed hint that carries neither to jti-only semantics instead of inventing a value. Tests: the two AuthServiceReloadSessionTest success cases assert the exact registered auth_time; the server-key InteractiveGrantTypeTest asserts iat is forwarded, and a new case asserts an explicit auth_time claim wins over iat.
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…dHint value object reloadSession(string $jti, ?string $user_id, ?int $auth_time) admitted states that mean nothing: a user_id without an attested auth_time, or the reverse. The rule "sub-based fallback only for an IDP-signed hint that carries an auth_time" lived as a ternary at the single call site, and the service kept a time() safety net for an auth_time that could never actually be missing. SessionReloadHint makes those states unrepresentable through two named constructors: jtiOnly() for hints verified with a client-controlled key, and withSubFallback() for hints verified with the IDP's own signing key, which requires both user_id and auth_time. Both fallback branches in reloadSession() now share loginFromReloadHint(), and the time() fallback is gone. user_id is typed int end to end (unwrapUserId() returns a string that getUserById(int) was coercing implicitly). No behaviour change. IAuthService has a single implementer and a single caller; tests updated to build the value object and to match on it.
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Sep 22, 2026
#158) * fix(reload-session): reload session from user_id provided from id token Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com> * fix(oauth2): reject unsigned id_token_hint and stop login loop on hint failure An id_token_hint built as an UnsecuredJWT (alg=none) is neither IJWE nor IJWS, so it skipped the whole signature-verification block and fell straight through to trusting its sub/jti unconditionally. Combined with the reload-session fallback that authenticates by user_id when the session can't be resumed, this let anyone forge an unsigned id_token_hint and get logged in as an arbitrary user_id with no credentials. Now any hint that isn't a verified IJWS is rejected before sub/jti are read. Separately, the id_token_hint param was only marked as processed after a successful reloadSession(). A hint that fails (stale, wrong audience, expired) never got marked, so every subsequent resume of the pending OAuth2 memento reprocessed the same hint, failed again, and logged the user back out - including right after a successful password login redirects back to /oauth2/auth. That turned any invalid hint into a login loop with no way out short of clearing site data. The param is now marked processed as soon as hint processing begins, so a failed hint is retried at most once per attempt. Full test suite green (244 tests, 1173 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com> * test(oauth2): cover unsigned id_token_hint rejection and login-loop fix Adds two unit tests for the fix in e913375: - testProcessUserHintRejectsUnsignedAlgNoneIdTokenHint: builds a real, parseable alg=none id_token_hint (RFC 7519 unsecured JWT) and asserts its forged sub/jti never reach unwrapUserId/getUserById/reloadSession. Fails against the pre-fix code with a TypeError from getUserById receiving the forged sub unchecked, proving the hint used to be trusted before any signature check. - testFailedIdTokenHintIsMarkedProcessedToPreventLoginLoop: asserts the id_token_hint param is marked processed on the request object even when hint processing fails. Fails against the pre-fix code (flag stays false), proving a failed hint used to be retried - and fail, and log the user out - on every resume of the pending OAuth2 memento. Both verified red against the parent commit and green against the fix. Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com> * fix(auth): honor canLogin() and fail closed in reloadSession fallback Addresses 3 CodeRabbit findings on PR #158: - Both fallback Auth::login() calls (empty-cache and post-catch) only checked is_null($user), not $user->canLogin(). getUserById() doesn't filter by account status, so a locked/deactivated/unverified user with a still-valid id_token_hint could bypass the lock via this path, unlike every other login entry point in this file which already gates on canLogin(). - The ReloadSessionException catch block returned normally (no throw) when $user_id was null, silently swallowing a real reload failure and violating the method's own \@throws contract. It now returns only after a successful fallback login, and rethrows otherwise. - Added a \Throwable catch alongside the existing ReloadSessionException one: a DB error inside getUserById() (not a ReloadSessionException) previously escaped uncaught, leaving the caller's session pointed at the swapped-in (possibly stale) session id instead of being restored - the same collateral-damage bug this PR set out to fix, via a different exception type. Full suite green (246 tests, 1176 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com> * fix(oauth2): validate id_token_hint expiration and register IDP principal Addresses the remaining findings on PR #158 (Copilot review): - processUserHint() now rejects an id_token_hint whose exp has passed, right after signature verification. A verified signature only proves who issued the token, not that it's still inside its validity window - the jti cache TTL mirrors the token's lifetime but isn't a reliable substitute for checking exp directly (eviction timing, clock skew). Deliberately NOT validating aud: this hint is the SSO mechanism between different clients of this IDP (client A -> client B), so the token's original audience is expected to differ from the client presenting it. - Both reloadSession() fallback Auth::login() calls now pair with principal_service->clear()+register(), matching every other login entry point in AuthService. Auth::login() alone left the IDP's own principal state (user_id/auth_time/op_browser_state) unset even though Auth::check() would report the user as logged in. Tests: - tests/AuthServiceReloadSessionTest.php (new): unit-tests reloadSession directly (facade-mocked, no DB) for canLogin() enforcement, principal registration on both fallback paths, the \Throwable session-restore path, and the no-fallback-user_id rethrow. - OIDCColdSessionReloadTest::testColdSessionRejectsExpiredIdTokenHint: real end-to-end test with an actually-expired, correctly-signed token (via a configurable near-zero id_token lifetime + sleep, no hand-forged signature). - Both new test groups verified red against the pre-fix code, green against the fix. Full suite green (253 tests, 1250 assertions, 0 failures). Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com> * fix(oauth2): only unlock id_token_hint sub fallback for IDP-signed hints reloadSession()'s sub-based fallback (login by user_id when the hint's jti is no longer cached) was offered for any id_token_hint whose signature verified, including one verified with a key the client controls: an HS* client secret, a public key the client registered, or its jwks_uri. Such a signature proves the client made the token, not the IDP, so a client operator could mint a hint naming an arbitrary user id and obtain a session for it once the jti lookup missed. processUserHint now tracks whether the signature was verified with the server's own signing key and passes user_id to reloadSession() only in that case. Client-key-verified hints keep the jti-only semantics. Tests: - unit: a client-secret-signed hint reaches reloadSession() with a null user_id; a server-key-signed hint still carries the resolved user_id - e2e: a hint signed with the seeded client's HS512 secret and an unknown jti lands on /auth/login with no authenticated user (was: logged in and sent to consent) * fix(oauth2): reject id_token_hint with exp == now or without sub Two claim-validation gaps on a verified id_token_hint: - exp: NumericDate::isBefore() is a strict `<`, so a hint whose exp equals the current second passed the expiry check. RFC 7519 §4.1.4 requires the current time to be strictly before exp; the guard is now `!$expiration_time->isAfter(NumericDate::now())`. - sub: a hint without a sub claim dereferenced null (`$sub->getString()`), raising an Error that the Exception-only catch in mustAuthenticateUser() does not handle, so the request 500'd instead of falling through to the login redirect. Added the same null guard jti and exp already have. Tests (unit, InteractiveGrantTypeTest): a hint with exp = now and a hint without sub are both rejected before reloadSession() and end at the login page. * fix(oauth2): register hint auth_time on id_token_hint sub fallback The sub-based fallback in AuthService::reloadSession() registered the IDP principal with time(), although the user did not authenticate on that request: they authenticated when the IDP issued the hint. That made shouldForceReLogin() treat a stale authentication as fresh and stamped a false auth_time into the next id_token. reloadSession() now takes an optional auth_time and registers it in both fallback branches (time() stays only as a safety net). InteractiveGrantType::processUserHint() resolves it from the hint's auth_time claim, else its iat, and degrades a server-signed hint that carries neither to jti-only semantics instead of inventing a value. Tests: the two AuthServiceReloadSessionTest success cases assert the exact registered auth_time; the server-key InteractiveGrantTypeTest asserts iat is forwarded, and a new case asserts an explicit auth_time claim wins over iat. * refactor(auth): pass id_token_hint reload semantics as a SessionReloadHint value object reloadSession(string $jti, ?string $user_id, ?int $auth_time) admitted states that mean nothing: a user_id without an attested auth_time, or the reverse. The rule "sub-based fallback only for an IDP-signed hint that carries an auth_time" lived as a ternary at the single call site, and the service kept a time() safety net for an auth_time that could never actually be missing. SessionReloadHint makes those states unrepresentable through two named constructors: jtiOnly() for hints verified with a client-controlled key, and withSubFallback() for hints verified with the IDP's own signing key, which requires both user_id and auth_time. Both fallback branches in reloadSession() now share loginFromReloadHint(), and the time() fallback is gone. user_id is typed int end to end (unwrapUserId() returns a string that getUserById(int) was coercing implicitly). No behaviour change. IAuthService has a single implementer and a single caller; tests updated to build the value object and to match on it. --------- Signed-off-by: smarcet <smarcet@gmail.com>
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Copilot review overview
🟡 Changes recommended
Unresolved revocation and session-restoration issues, plus a missing-key handling failure, remain before approval.
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| if (empty($session_id)) { | ||
| Log::warning("AuthService::reloadSession session_id is not present at cache"); | ||
| if($hint->allowsSubFallback()) { | ||
| $this->loginFromReloadHint($hint); | ||
| return; |
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ref: https://app.clickup.com/t/9014802374/86bb5t7jc
Summary
Fixes two issues in the OIDC
id_token_hintSSO-handoff path(
InteractiveGrantType::processUserHint/AuthService::reloadSession):Auth bypass (security): an
id_token_hintbuilt withalg: noneparses as an
UnsecuredJWT— neitherIJWEnorIJWS— and skippedsignature verification entirely. Combined with the reload-session
fallback that authenticates by the hint's
subwhen the originalsession can't be resumed, this let anyone forge an unsigned hint and
get logged in as an arbitrary user, with no credentials. Any hint
that isn't a verified
IJWSis now rejected beforesub/jtiareread.
Login loop: a failed
id_token_hintwas only marked "processed"after a successful
reloadSession(). An invalid hint (stale,wrong audience, expired) never got marked, so every resume of the
pending OAuth2 memento reprocessed the same hint, failed again, and
logged the user back out — including right after a fresh, valid
password login redirected back to
/oauth2/auth. The param is nowmarked processed as soon as hint processing begins.
AuthService::reloadSession()no longer leaves the caller's realsession clobbered when the hint fails — it restores the original
session id at every failure exit point before propagating.
sub-based fallback, restricted to IDP-signed hints.reloadSession()gains an optionaluser_id: when the hint'sjtiis no longer cached (or the cached session can't be resumed), it logs
in the user the hint names, honoring
canLogin()and registering theIDP principal like every other login path. Because a signature that
verifies with a client-controlled key (an
HS*client secret, apublic key the client registered, its
jwks_uri) only proves theclient made the token,
processUserHintpassesuser_idonly whenthe signature was verified with the IDP's own server signing key.
Client-key-verified hints keep the previous jti-only semantics. The
hint's
expis also enforced before any of this runs. The fallbackregisters the IDP principal with the authentication time the hint
attests (its
auth_timeclaim, elseiat), not with "now", somax_ageenforcement and the next id_token'sauth_timestaytruthful; a server-signed hint carrying neither degrades to jti-only.
Tests
InteractiveGrantTypeTest(unit): unsignedalg=nonehint is rejectedbefore
sub/jtiare read; a failed hint is still marked processed;a client-secret-signed hint reaches
reloadSession()with a nulluser_id; a server-key-signed hint carries the resolveduser_idandits
iatasauth_time, or its explicitauth_timeclaim when present.AuthServiceReloadSessionTest(unit): both fallback branches honorcanLogin()and register the principal with the attestedauth_timerather than
time(); a non-ReloadSessionExceptionfailure restores the former session and rethrows; no-fallback failures
rethrow.
OIDCColdSessionReloadTest(e2e): an expired, correctly-signed hintrequires login; a hint signed with the seeded client's
HS512secretand an unknown
jtilands on/auth/loginwith no authenticated user(before the fix it logged the user in and sent them to consent).
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests