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docs(design): publish the compass-agent image for linux/arm64 (RIG-3625) #1167

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trunk-io merged 5 commits into from
Sep 12, 2026
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docs(design): publish the compass-agent image for linux/arm64 (RIG-3625) #1167

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6a4067b
docs(design): publish the compass-agent image for linux/arm64 (RIG-3625)
rigel-mintaka Sep 12, 2026
2857a9c
docs(design): close two review gaps in the arm64 image record (RIG-3625)
rigel-mintaka Sep 12, 2026
0acc9e2
docs(design): forbid landing the arm64 entrypoint seam on its own (RI…
rigel-mintaka Sep 12, 2026
5af033a
docs(design): renumber the arm64 image ledger row to DL-366 (RIG-3625)
rigel-mintaka Sep 12, 2026
fb49ac6
chore: sync the arm64 image record branch with main (RIG-3625)
rigel-mintaka Sep 12, 2026
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/designs/DECISIONS.md
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Expand Up @@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ check enforces the mechanical half. Full rationale:
| DL-361 | Secret resolution is most-specific-wins — `agent > user > tenant`, ONE value per name in the injected environment — collapsed in SQL (`DISTINCT ON` ordered by `scope_kind DESC`, the numeric encoding being the precedence) so shadowed rows never leave Postgres or get decrypted; `FetchSecrets` resolves per agent account using the identity the runnerhub authz maps (`sessionAccounts`/`containerAccounts`) already hold and previously discarded, the user tier reached through the single `agent_accounts.owner_user_id` FK hop. Scope is an ADDITIONAL filter inside a tenant — RLS tenant isolation stays the outer boundary, never replaced. The existing `SetSecret`/`DeleteSecret` verbs stay pinned to the tenant coordinate, preserving inject-all behavior until a scope wire surface is ruled | Active (Matt, 2026-09-11) | [user-secret store §A9](server/compass-user-secret-store.md#a9--scope-model-tenant--user--agent-most-specific-wins) |
| DL-362 | The canonical user-secret AAD is the five-field tuple `"compass/user-secret/v1\x00" + tenantID + "\x00" + decimal(scopeKind) + "\x00" + scopeID + "\x00" + name + "\x00" + decimal(keyVersion)` (Go: `UserSecretAAD(tenantID string, scopeKind int16, scopeID, name string, keyVersion int16) []byte`; SMALLINTs rendered `strconv.FormatInt(int64(v), 10)`), every field bound unconditionally (a tenant row binds scopeID as the empty string) with `\x00` separators keeping the encoding injective. Fixed BEFORE any migration ships because the AAD is baked into every ciphertext — a scope field added later would force a re-encrypt of every row. Refines DL-351's four-field AAD clause; DL-351's other rulings stand | Active (Matt, 2026-09-11) | [user-secret store §A9](server/compass-user-secret-store.md#a9--scope-model-tenant--user--agent-most-specific-wins) |
| DL-363 | Writing a tenant-scoped user-secret row requires an admin (`store.UserRoleAdmin`, `go/internal/store/types.go`), reusing the existing role elevation rather than introducing a permission concept: tenant (0) admin-only, user (1) and agent (2) writable by the owning user or an admin. The check lands in the store door inside the same writing transaction as DL-360's FK-substitute referential checks, so one place enforces both. READS are deliberately asymmetric — a plain user's agent resolves tenant rows, which is the point of a shared tenant value under DL-361; reading a shared secret is the feature, writing one is the privileged act. The wire surface for a scoped write stays undecided (a scope selector on `SetSecretRequest` is a public-proto fork) | Active (Matt, 2026-09-12) | [user-secret store §D8](server/compass-user-secret-store.md#resolved-decisions) |
| DL-366 | The `compass-agent` image publishes as a multi-arch OCI image index carrying exactly `linux/amd64` + `linux/arm64` under the existing `:git-<sha12>`/`:latest`/`:vX.Y.Z` tags, each arch built NATIVELY on its own runner (`ubuntu-latest` + the free public-repo `ubuntu-24.04-arm`, never QEMU) and composed by member digest in a serialized manifest job. Consumer-facing tags stay bare, so every puller relies on engine platform negotiation and no consumer changes; the per-arch `:git-<sha12>-<arch>` tags are internal immutable building blocks. Every single-digest guard is carried forward at manifest-list level rather than dropped — immutability, two-tag coherence and the semver re-tag compare list digests, and the `linux/amd64` platform tripwire becomes an exact platform-SET assertion plus per-member arch/os checks, a stricter contract than the one it replaces. Supersedes the `linux/amd64` single-arch platform contract of the agent-image publish record; that record's tag names, immutability posture, auth pin and build-once mechanism all stay live | Active (Matt, 2026-09-12) | [arm64 agent image §Decision A](infra/ci/compass-agent-arm64-image/design.md#decision-a--consumer-facing-tags-are-a-manifest-list-per-arch-tags-are-internal) |

> Note (2026-07-31, RIG-1570 R5): DL-065's retired internal `ResumeContext
> resume = 12` envelope field is NOT silently reintroduced — the collapsed
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