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SPS security hardening - #11

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batteryshark merged 1 commit into
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uplift/sps-hardening
Oct 25, 2026
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batteryshark merged 1 commit into
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uplift/sps-hardening

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Security hardening for SPS (Secrets Procurement Service).

What changes

  • Grant policy: a registration may only bind its own item by default; other items need an explicit [grants] entry in the SPS config. Registrations are audited with hashed field/item and entry counts.
  • Audit retention: ping and malformed traffic no longer write a line per event (rate-bounded counters instead); several rotated generations are kept.
  • TLS handshake has an absolute deadline.
  • Provider errors on the bulk read path are reported as backend errors; unknown tool ids answer like a wrong credential; credentials are hidden from repr; vault-set/vault-get honour the passphrase file; written values are capped (64 KiB default, configurable); non-loopback binds need an explicit flag; new vaults use a stronger KDF (existing vaults unchanged); longer self-signed certificate validity with an expiry warning; the tool SDK refuses the fake path when a real tool credential is present.

Upgrade notes

  • Cross-tool item bindings and non-loopback SPS binds now need explicit configuration.
  • Existing vaults and certificates keep working.

@batteryshark
batteryshark merged commit e8eff7b into main Oct 25, 2026
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