feat(platform)!: allow authentication keys with a budget and an expiry - #4798
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You can disable this status message by setting the 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughProtocol version 14 adds optional budgets and expiry times to limited AUTHENTICATION keys. The change adds versioned key models, validation, Drive storage, signing and fee enforcement, consensus errors, protocol configuration, serialization, tests, and documentation. ChangesAuthentication key limits
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant StateTransition
participant IdentitySignatureValidation
participant Drive
participant FeeValidation
participant EventExecution
StateTransition->>IdentitySignatureValidation: Validate V1 signing key
IdentitySignatureValidation->>Drive: Fetch remaining key budget
Drive-->>IdentitySignatureValidation: Return budget
IdentitySignatureValidation->>FeeValidation: Store SigningKeyLimits in execution context
FeeValidation->>FeeValidation: Check expiry and required budget
FeeValidation->>EventExecution: Return validated fee result
EventExecution->>Drive: Deduct spent credits from key budget
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The change can undercharge limited-key operations and record outputs for transfers that never executed. These accounting and state-integration defects should be fixed before merge. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 29.67% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 209 functions across 50 files. (48 skipped: 3 unsupported, 45 over the file limit.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
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Codecov Report❌ Patch coverage is Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## v4.2-dev #4798 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 78.11% 79.79% +1.67%
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Files 2916 2935 +19
Lines 419165 421983 +2818
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+ Hits 327434 336711 +9277
+ Misses 91731 85272 -6459
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Inline comments:
In
`@packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/execute_event/v1/mod.rs`:
- Around line 177-180: Update the event execution flow around
record_added_balance_outputs so added_to_balance_outputs is recorded only after
a paid IdentityCreditTransferToAddresses event is successfully executed. Ensure
fee-rejected expired or over-budget events do not record recipient outputs,
while preserving output recording for successfully paid events.
In
`@packages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/batch/tests/key_limits.rs`:
- Around line 345-346: Update the remaining-budget assertion in the key-limits
test to unwrap the value returned by setup.remaining_budget(&tx) before
comparing it with dash_to_credits!(0.5), so the test requires the budget entry
to exist.
- Around line 379-383: Update the assertion for expired-key processing in the
key-limit tests to require the specific PUBLIC_KEY_EXPIRED result, matching the
other expiry tests. Remove the InternalError alternative so internal execution
failures cannot satisfy the test.
In
`@packages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/add_estimation_costs_for_key_budgets/v0/mod.rs`:
- Around line 14-24: Update the AllItems estimate in the
estimated_costs_only_with_layer_info entry to use 5 as the encoded KeyID size
instead of 1, while preserving KEY_BUDGET_SIZE and the surrounding
EstimatedLayerInformation configuration.
In
`@packages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/deduct_from_identity_key_budget/v0/mod.rs`:
- Around line 22-24: Update the deduction flow around
fetch_identity_key_remaining_budget_operations to preserve and return the
read_operations vector alongside the replacement deduction operation. Use the
same operation vector for the budget read and replacement so fee calculation
includes both stateful read and deduction costs.
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book/src/sdk/identity-keys.mddocs/protocol/authentication-key-limits.mddocs/protocol/contract-bound-authentication-keys.mdpackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/basic/basic_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/basic/identity/identity_public_key_limits_not_allowed_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/basic/identity/invalid_identity_public_key_budget_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/basic/identity/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/codes.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/signature/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/signature/public_key_budget_exhausted_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/signature/public_key_expired_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/signature/signature_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/state/identity/identity_public_key_already_expired_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/state/identity/identity_public_key_budget_exceeded_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/state/identity/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/errors/consensus/state/state_error.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/accessors/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/accessors/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/methods/hash/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v0/methods/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v1/accessors/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v1/methods/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/identity/identity_public_key/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/accessors.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/methods/hash/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/methods/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/methods/validate_identity_public_keys_structure/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/methods/validate_identity_public_keys_structure/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/v1/types.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/v1/version.rspackages/rs-dpp/src/state_transition/state_transitions/identity/public_key_in_creation/version.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/execute_event/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/execute_event/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/validate_fees_of_event/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/validate_fees_of_event/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/platform_events/state_transition_processing/validate_fees_of_event/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/types/execution_event/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/types/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/types/signing_key_limits.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/types/state_transition_execution_context/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/types/state_transition_execution_context/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/common/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/common/validate_identity_public_keys_limits/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/common/validate_identity_public_keys_limits/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/common/validate_state_transition_identity_signed/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/batch/tests/contract_bound_auth.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/batch/tests/key_limits.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/batch/tests/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_create/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_create/state/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_create_from_addresses/state/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_create_from_shielded_pool/state/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_credit_transfer_to_addresses/tests.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_update/mod.rspackages/rs-drive-abci/src/execution/validation/state_transition/state_transitions/identity_update/state/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/add_estimation_costs_for_key_budgets/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/add_estimation_costs_for_key_budgets/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/deduct_from_identity_key_budget/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/deduct_from_identity_key_budget/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/fetch_identity_key_remaining_budget/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/fetch_identity_key_remaining_budget/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/insert_identity_key_budget/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/insert_identity_key_budget/v0/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/budget/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/insert/insert_new_non_unique_key/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/insert/insert_new_non_unique_key/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/insert/insert_new_unique_key/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/insert/insert_new_unique_key/v1/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/key/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/drive/identity/mod.rspackages/rs-drive/src/util/batch/grovedb_op_batch/mod.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/dpp_versions/dpp_state_transition_method_versions/mod.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/dpp_versions/dpp_state_transition_method_versions/v2.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_method_versions/v10.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/mod.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v1.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v10.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v2.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v3.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v4.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v5.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v6.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v7.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v8.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_abci_versions/drive_abci_validation_versions/v9.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_versions/drive_identity_method_versions/mod.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_versions/drive_identity_method_versions/v1.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/drive_versions/drive_identity_method_versions/v2.rspackages/rs-platform-version/src/version/v14.rspackages/rs-platform-wallet/src/wallet/identity/crypto/validation.rspackages/strategy-tests/src/transitions.rspackages/wasm-dpp/src/errors/consensus/consensus_error.rspackages/wasm-drive-verify/src/identity/verify_identity_keys_by_identity_id.rs
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An AUTHENTICATION key below the MASTER level may carry a budget, an expiry, or both, from protocol version 14. Once the budget is spent or the expiry is reached the key can no longer sign. The limits live on a new version 1 public key (and public key in creation), which is the version 0 key followed by `budget` and `expires_at`. Version 0 bytes are untouched and keys without limits are still written as version 0. A transition carrying a version 1 key in creation is active from 14. What is left of a budget is kept in a new per-identity key budgets subtree, written when the key is added. Identity signature validation v1 refuses a spent key and records the limits of the signing key; fee validation v1 refuses an expired key and a spend the remaining budget does not cover; event execution v1 deducts what the transition took from the identity. Budget rule: credits moved out of the identity, the storage fee, fees priced up front and the user fee increase must fit in what is left. Only the metered processing fee may take a key over its budget, after which nothing is left. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ielded pool IdentityCreateFromShieldedPool has no identity signature. Its keys are bound into the Orchard sighash preimage field by field, in a layout that predates the version 1 key, so a budget or an expiry would not be covered: on a key type without a proof of possession a relay could strip or alter the limits. Follow the decision taken for contract group bounds: keep the v0 preimage frozen and refuse the key instead. `validate_shielded_proof` v1 (unreleased) refuses a version 1 key before the preimage is built, with the new basic error 10538, and the transition builder refuses it up front. Such a key is added with an identity update once the identity exists. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Explains how limited authentication keys work end to end: the version 1 key and why it is a new key version, the registration rules and the shielded pool exception, the budget rule with a worked example, where each check runs in the validation pipeline and why expiry waits for fee validation, how the limits travel from signature validation to execution, the key budgets subtree, and the versioning touchpoints. Seven Mermaid diagrams: key lifecycle, wire layout, registration decision flow, the budget rule, the pipeline stages, a sequence of how the limits are carried, and the storage layout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The key holds the fixed amount the identity granted; what is left of it is a different number that Drive tracks. A bare `budget` on a key fetched from the network reads as what is left, which is wrong as soon as anything has been spent. `total_budget` (`totalBudget` in JSON) pairs with the `remaining_budget` the Drive side already uses. The binary encoding is unchanged; the accessor is `total_budget()` on both the key and the key in creation. The book chapter also loses its "Why a New Key Version" section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…tity creation Identity creation from the shielded pool refused every version 1 key. What the frozen sighash preimage cannot bind is a budget or an expiry, not the key format: a version 1 key without limits binds the same preimage bytes as the version 0 key with the same fields. Refuse only a key that carries a limit, in `validate_shielded_proof` v1 and in the transition builder, so shielded identity creation keeps working if version 1 becomes the default key format. A limit still cannot be stripped, added or altered, since a key with one is never accepted there. What stays possible, and only when every key of the transition is hash based (one proof of possession signs every key's variant and limits), is a relay re-encoding a limit-less key between the two equivalent versions. Tests pin both sides in consensus and in the builder, and that the preimage of a limit-less version 1 key equals that of its version 0 equivalent. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Brings in the review of contract group key bounds (#4801), which moved the "key bound to a contract group" predicate into one helper on IdentityPublicKeyInCreation, shared by the protocol version gate, shielded proof validation and the transition builder. The two conflicts were where this branch had extended that inline predicate. Resolved by following the same shape: `first_in_version_1_format` (the gate: a binary from before cannot decode the format, limits or not) and `first_with_limits` (shielded identity creation and its builder) sit next to `first_bound_to_a_contract_group`, and all three call sites use them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…pter The merge of v4.2-dev moved the protocol version gate onto helpers on IdentityPublicKeyInCreation; the chapter quoted the old inline predicate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- execute_event v1 records address outputs only for an event that was executed, not for one fee validation refused. - The key budgets layer is estimated with the widest varint key id (5 bytes) instead of the narrowest, so large key ids are never under-estimated. - The deduction returns the cost of reading the remaining budget with the replace, in one operation vector, like the balance change it follows. - Tests: the remaining budget is unwrapped before it is compared (`None` is less than any `Some`), and the unpayable invalid transition must be the internal error carrying the original failure, not any internal error. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Reviewed |
Issue being fixed or feature implemented
A key handed to an application today is limited in scope at most (#4780 contract bounds, #4793 contract group bounds, both merged), never in amount or in time: it can spend the whole identity balance until a master-key update disables it.
This lets an AUTHENTICATION key carry a budget, an expiry, or both (protocol version 14). Once the budget is spent or the expiry is reached the key can no longer sign. Both combine freely with contract bounds: bounds say where a key may act, limits say how much and for how long.
What was done?
Wire format (
rs-dpp)IdentityPublicKey::V1andIdentityPublicKeyInCreation::V1: the version 0 fields in the same order, followed bytotal_budget: Option<Credits>andexpires_at: Option<TimestampMillis>(absolute block time in ms, same clock asdisabled_at).total_budgetis the fixed amount granted; what is left of it is a separate number Drive tracks (remaining_budgetin the code), hence the name. In JSON:totalBudget,expiresAt. Both fields are in the signable bytes of the transition that registers the key.identity_key_structure_versionstays 0), so only identities that opt in carry the new format.IdentityPublicKeyGettersV1(total_budget,expires_at,is_expired_at,has_limits;Nonefor a V0 key) andIdentityPublicKey::with_limits. The key hashing bodies moved into shared helpers so V1 does not duplicate the crypto (mechanical, no behaviour change).active_version_range_for_keys_in_creationthat gates group-bound keys, so earlier versions refuse the transition while decoding, like a binary that predates the format. Following fix(platform)!: apply the review of contract group key bounds #4801, the predicates are helpers onIdentityPublicKeyInCreationnext tofirst_bound_to_a_contract_group:first_in_version_1_format(the gate) andfirst_with_limits(shielded identity creation, in consensus and in the builder).Rules at registration
validate_identity_public_keys_structurev1 (STATE_TRANSITION_METHOD_VERSIONS_V2): limits only on AUTHENTICATION keys below MASTER; a budget is not zero.validate_identity_public_keys_limits, called from the four PV14 identity create/updatestate/v1modules: the expiry is after the block time. A dead-on-arrival key would still burn its id and, for a unique key type, its public key hash (seconds instead of milliseconds is the usual cause).IdentityCreateFromShieldedPoolrefuses a key that carries a budget or an expiry. That transition has no identity signature; its keys are bound into the frozen v0 Orchard sighash preimage field by field, and the limits are not in it. One ECDSA or BLS proof of possession signs every key's variant and limits, so the exposure is a transition whose keys are all hash based, where a relay could strip or alter them. Same decision as for group bounds in feat(platform)!: allow authentication keys bound to a contract group #4793: keep the preimage frozen, refuse invalidate_shielded_proofv1 (unreleased, extended in place) before the preimage is built, and in the builder up front. A V1 key without limits is accepted, since it binds the same preimage bytes as its V0 equivalent; this keeps shielded creation working if V1 becomes the default format. What that leaves possible, in the all-hash-keys case only, is a relay re-encoding a limit-less key between the two equivalent versions (two stored bytes and a different transition hash). Tests pin both preimage equalities.Drive
IdentityTreeKeyBudgets = 224, created with the first budgeted key:key id -> remaining creditsas a fixed 8 byte value, so spending replaces it without changing what is stored.insert_new_unique_key/insert_new_non_unique_keyv1 write the full budget when the key is added (billed to whoever adds it).fetch_identity_key_remaining_budget,deduct_from_identity_key_budget(stops at zero).Enforcement (
rs-drive-abci), without touching any shippedv0modulePublicKeyBudgetExhaustedError, and recordsSigningKeyLimitsin the execution context, whichExecutionEvent::Paidcarries forward.validate_fees_of_eventv1 (runs in check tx and at execution; the first stage with the block time): refuses an expired key, and a spend the remaining budget does not cover.execute_eventv1: after the balance change, deductsremoved_balanceplus the fee the identity owes (net of its own refunds) from the key budget. Paid failures spend from the budget too. The deduction is applied outside of the fee, like the balance write.Budget rule. Credits moved out of the identity (document purchase, prefunded voting balance), the storage fee, fees priced up front (contract registration) and the user fee increase must fit in what is left. Only the metered processing fee may take a key over its budget; the identity pays it in full and nothing is left of the budget. This is the identity balance rule (storage required, processing may leave a debt) applied to the key.
Errors: basic 10536
IdentityPublicKeyLimitsNotAllowedError, 10537InvalidIdentityPublicKeyBudgetError, 10538IdentityPublicKeyLimitsNotAllowedInShieldedIdentityCreationError; signature 20015PublicKeyBudgetExhaustedError, 20016PublicKeyExpiredError; state 40218IdentityPublicKeyBudgetExceededError, 40219IdentityPublicKeyAlreadyExpiredError. All appended after #4793's 10535 variant.Docs: a new book chapter,
book/src/data-model/key-limits.md("Key Budgets and Expiry"), explains the design end to end with seven Mermaid diagrams (key lifecycle, wire layout, registration decision flow, the budget rule, where each check runs in the pipeline, how the limits are carried, storage layout); the book preview job renders it. Alsodocs/protocol/authentication-key-limits.mdas the rules and error code reference, a section in the identity keys chapter, and the "what bounds do not do" section of the contract-bound keys doc.Decisions worth a look
expires_atrather than a relative TTL: a duration would make the stored key differ from the signed one and thread block time through everyInCreation -> IdentityPublicKeyconversion. SDKs can offer TTL sugar.Recheckskips signature validation, so limits are not re-checked there; the proposer drops the transition.Not included (follow-ups): a query for the remaining budget, SDK / wasm / Swift / Kotlin helpers for creating limited keys and choosing a usable key, wallet storage columns, changing the limits of an existing key.
Rebased onto v4.2-dev after #4793 merged, then merged v4.2-dev again for #4801; tests of theirs that destructured the single-variant key enum now use
let ... else.How Has This Been Tested?
rs-dpp: V1 round trip, V0 encoding byte-identical, JSON shape, expiry boundary, limits survive theInCreationconversions and are signed over, structure v1 rules, the PV13/PV14 decode gate, frozen error discriminants. Full suite:cargo test -p dpp --all-features --lib(4275 pass before the rebase; the targeted dpp, drive and drive-abci sets were rerun on top of feat(platform)!: allow authentication keys bound to a contract group #4793: 192, 57 and 416 pass).rs-drive(drive::identity::key::budget): budget written on key add and on identity create, two budgeted keys in one batch, deduction stops at zero and never changes storage, estimated >= actual, PV13 untouched.cargo test -p drive --lib -- drive::identity::(existing fee baselines unchanged).rs-drive-abcibatch/tests/key_limits.rs(throughprocess_raw_state_transitionsandcheck_tx): exact deduction, the rule pinned atstorage fee - 1(refused) andstorage fee + 1(accepted, processing overshoots, budget ends at 0, next transition refused), user fee increase counted up front, expiry boundary, both limits together, paid failures spend from the budget, invalid transition through an unusable key is not charged, mempool admission.identity_updatekey_limitstests: registration success (stored V1 key, full remaining budget), already expired (paid), limits on TRANSFER / MASTER and zero budget (unpaid).identity_create_from_shielded_pool/tests.rsand the builder tests inrs-dpp: a key with either limit is refused (10538 in consensus, a build error in the builder) before any proof work, a V1 key without limits is accepted; feat(platform)!: allow authentication keys bound to a contract group #4793's group-bound refusal still passes next to it.cargo clippy -p dpp -p drive -p drive-abci -p platform-version --all-features --all-targets -- -D warnings,cargo fmt --all -- --check,cargo check --workspace --all-targets,cargo check -p drive --no-default-features --features verify, and the suites of the other touched crates (platform-wallet,wasm-drive-verify,wasm-dpp,strategy-tests,platform-version).drive-abcisuite and the JS / mobile jobs.Breaking Changes
Consensus-breaking, gated to protocol version 14: a new public key format, new validation rules, a new identity subtree, and new consensus errors. Nothing changes for protocol versions up to 13.
Clients that do not know the version 1 key cannot decode an identity that holds one. Only identities that register a limited key are affected.
Checklist:
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