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chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop) - #105

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chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop)#105
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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
vitest (source) ^2.0.5^4.0.0 age confidence

When Vitest UI server is listening, arbitrary file can be read and executed

CVE-2026-47429 / GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp

More information

Details

Summary

Arbitrary file can be read on Windows when Vitest UI server is listening, especially when exposed to the network.

Impact

Only users that match either of the following conditions are affected:

  • explicitly exposes the Vitest UI server to the network (using --api.host or api.host config option)
  • running the Vitest UI or Browser Mode on Windows
Details

The API handler for /__vitest_attachment__ uses the deprecated isFileServingAllowed incorrectly.
https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/ui/node/index.ts#L77
The function expects the passed value to use cleanUrl after the check before file system related operation.
Because of this, it is possible to bypass the check by \\?\\..\\. This is not possible on Linux as Linux errors if a directory named ? does not exist.

A similar problem exists in other places as well.

That said, this isFileServingAllowed check does not actually prevent the API to be abused. Since the API has rerun feature and file write feature, it's possible to run arbitrary script by writing a script as a test file using saveTestFile and running it using rerun. This means exposing the API / Vitest UI is equivalent to giving script execution access.
On the browser mode side, there're readFile / writeFile / saveSnapshotFile. So exposing the browser mode is equivalent to giving file read / write access.

PoC
  1. Run Vitest UI
  2. Get the API token by curl http://localhost:51204/__vitest__/
  3. Run curl "http://localhost:51204/__vitest_attachment__?path=C:\\path\\to\\project\\?\\..\\..\\secret.txt&contentType=text/plain&token=$TOKEN" (TOKEN is the API token)
  4. curl shows the content of secret.txt that is outside the project directory
Mitigations

Vitest now ships two configuration flags, allowWrite and allowExec, that gate the privileged operations exploited by this vulnerability. Both are disabled by default whenever the API server is bound to a non-localhost host, ensuring that exposing the server to the network no longer implicitly grants write or execute capabilities to remote clients.

When these flags are disabled, the UI also enters a read-only mode: in-browser code editing and test file execution are turned off, removing the attack surface that allowed remote code execution. Many Browser Mode features are also disabled, like attachments, artifacts or snapshots. See browser.api.

Users who require the full interactive UI on a networked host must explicitly opt in by setting allowWrite and/or allowExec to true.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 9.8 / 10 (Critical)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Vitest: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read via @​vitest/mocker Redirect Mock

CVE-2026-84373 / GHSA-82fw-gwwq-j7x9

More information

Details

Summary

@vitest/mocker registers a redirect mock's target path without validating it
against the dev server's file-serving allowlist. An attacker who can reach the
dev server's WebSocket can register a redirect mock pointing outside the project
root; when the mocked module is requested, the plugin's load hook returns
readFile(<attacker path>) as the module source, disclosing local files.

This is exploitable without authentication only through the public
mockerPlugin / standalone interceptorPlugin exports (used by third-party dev
servers), which register the handler on Vite's unauthenticated HMR socket.
Vitest's own browser mode registers mocks over a token-authenticated RPC and
is not remotely reachable by default (see Scope).

Affected code

packages/mocker/src/node/interceptorPlugin.ts.

The load hook is the file-read sink:

if (mock.type === 'redirect') {
  return readFile(mock.redirect, 'utf-8')
}

mock.redirect is derived from client input at registration time with no
boundary check:

if (event.type === 'redirect') {
  const redirectUrl = new URL(event.redirect)
  event.redirect = join(server.config.root, redirectUrl.pathname)
}
registry.register(event)

There is no server.fs.allow / server.fs.deny check and no assertion that the
resolved path stays within the project root.

Registration paths and trust boundaries
  • Public mockerPlugin / interceptorPlugin (unauthenticated). In
    configureServer, the plugin registers server.ws.on('vitest:interceptor:register', …)
    on Vite's HMR WebSocket. That socket performs no token, Origin, or same-origin
    check, so any client that can reach it can register a redirect mock. This is
    the path the "unauthenticated" impact applies to.
  • Vitest browser mode (authenticated). Mocks register over the browser RPC
    (registerMock), which sits behind a per-run token (isValidApiRequest, a
    random api.token). The interceptor's configureServer socket is not used for
    registration here (in v5 it does not run at all, as the plugin is injected per
    environment). The same missing boundary check exists on the authenticated RPC
    path, but reaching it requires the token, so it is not a remote-unauthenticated
    read.
Path handling

new URL(redirect).pathname combined with join(root, pathname) does not
confine reads to the root:

  • Special/hierarchical schemes (file:, http:) are normalized by WHATWG URL,
    so .. segments are collapsed and the result stays under the root. Payloads of
    the form file:///../../etc/passwd do not escape.
  • A non-special (opaque) scheme preserves .. in pathname, so
    join(root, "../../…/etc/passwd") resolves outside the root and reads an
    arbitrary file.

Even without escaping the root, the missing server.fs check allows reading any
in-root file the dev server would otherwise refuse to serve (for example an
in-root .env or source that is denied by server.fs.deny).

Scope / preconditions
  • This is a development-server issue. The dev server binds to localhost by
    default and is not reachable from the network unless the developer exposes it
    (server.host / 0.0.0.0, a LAN bind, or a proxy).
  • A raw (non-browser) client against a reachable server bypasses browser origin
    and CORS protections entirely and can both register the mock and read the
    response.
  • A browser-based drive-by against a localhost server is substantially mitigated
    by Vite defaults: the default CORS origin allowlist is limited to localhost
    origins, and server.allowedHosts blocks DNS-rebinding, so a cross-origin page
    cannot read the file contents back.
Impact

Disclosure of local files readable by the dev-server process (source, in-root
.env/secrets, and, via the opaque-scheme payload, files outside the project
root). No integrity or availability impact.

Affected versions

Present since @vitest/mocker was introduced.

  • Affected: @vitest/mocker >= 2.1.0 (shipped in vitest and
    @vitest/browser >= 2.1.0), through 4.1.x and the 5.0.0 pre-releases.
  • Fixed: Vitest 4.1.11 and 5.0.0. Older majors (2.1.x, 3.x) are not
    maintained and are not planned to receive the fix.
Fix

Validate the resolved redirect target against Vite's file-serving allowlist
(isFileLoadingAllowed) before registering it, at every registration site, and
stop registering the interceptor WebSocket events in Vitest's browser mode
(mocks there flow through the authenticated RPC).

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.9 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


Release Notes

vitest-dev/vitest (vitest)

v4.1.11

Compare Source

   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.10

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   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.9

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🐞 Bug Fixes
  • Fix importOriginal with optimizer and query import [backport to v4] - by Hiroshi Ogawa, David Harris, Codexand Vladimir in #​10546 (a5180)
  • browser:
    • Wait for orchestrator readiness before resolving browser sessions [backport to v4] - by Vladimir and Séamus O'Connor in #​10555 (7fb29)
    • Wait for iframe tester readiness before preparing [backport to v4] - by Vladimir and Séamus O'Connor in #​10497 and #​10556 (fbc62)
  • mocker:
    • Hoist vi.mock() for vite-plus/test imports [backport to v4] - by Hiroshi Ogawa, LongYinan, Claude Opus 4.8 and Vladimir in #​10548 (2c955)
  • pool:
    • Prevent test run hang on worker crash [backport to v4] - by Ari Perkkiö and Jattioui Ismail in #​10543 and #​10564 (934b0)
View changes on GitHub

v4.1.8

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   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.7

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   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.6

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   🐞 Bug Fixes
   🏎 Performance
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.5

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   🚀 Experimental Features
   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.4

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   🚀 Features
   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.3

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   🚀 Experimental Features
   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.2

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This release bumps Vitest's flatted version and removes version pinning to resolve flatted's CVE related issues (#​9975).

   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.1

Compare Source

   🚀 Features
   🐞 Bug Fixes
    View changes on GitHub

v4.1.0

Compare Source

Vitest 4.1 is out!

This release page lists all changes made to the project during the 4.1 beta. To get a review of all the new features, read our blog post.

   🚀 Features

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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop) chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop) - autoclosed Jun 8, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Jun 8, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot deleted the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch June 8, 2026 19:33
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop) - autoclosed chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v3 [security] (develop) Jun 8, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Jun 8, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 5a99675 to 6496c13 Compare June 8, 2026 20:33
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch from 6496c13 to 87459d6 Compare July 12, 2026 11:30
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch from 87459d6 to 81fc904 Compare July 21, 2026 02:38
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renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch from 81fc904 to c55b9b4 Compare August 26, 2026 12:13
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 3a886f9 to 5b0f18f Compare September 10, 2026 03:16
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v3 [security] (develop) chore(deps): update dependency vitest to v4 [security] (develop) Sep 10, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/develop-npm-vitest-vulnerability branch from 5b0f18f to e7b3b64 Compare September 10, 2026 21:05
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