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feat(modules): add GCP IAM policy observer and public bucket tester - #15

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p4gs wants to merge 4 commits into
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p4gs wants to merge 4 commits into
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feat/12

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@p4gs p4gs commented Mar 7, 2026 •

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Update 2026-10-06: this branch was rebased onto main and changed since it was opened. Signing now uses ring instead of the rsa crate, rustls is bumped for RUSTSEC-2026-0285, and the RS256 tests no longer store a private key. Provenance is resolved: every commit now carries honest AI trailers, and the owner approved the dependency changes on 2026-10-12. See Provenance below. The text below describes the branch at 61ca4bf.

Summary

Adds GCP modules to cover the third major cloud provider alongside AWS (closes #12):

  • gcp.iam_policy observer — Queries GCP Resource Manager API for IAM policy bindings, checks for overly permissive roles (roles/owner, roles/editor, roles/iam.securityAdmin, roles/resourcemanager.projectIamAdmin). Produces passive_observation evidence.
  • gcp.public_bucket tester — Safety class: safe (read-only probe). Attempts unauthenticated access to Cloud Storage bucket object listing. Verifies bucket is not publicly accessible. Full test transcript included.

Credentials

  • GCP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY — JSON service account key (string)
  • GCP_PROJECT_ID — Target project
  • GCP_ACCESS_TOKEN — Optional: skip JWT flow (useful for testing)

Implementation Details

  • OAuth2 JWT-based service account authentication with RS256 signing via ring (sign_rs256). The original version used the rsa crate, which carries RUSTSEC-2023-0071 (Marvin timing side channel, unpatched); ring was already in the dependency tree through rustls.
  • No GCP SDK dependency — stdlib HTTP via ureq + JSON, matching project convention
  • Both modules registered in modules/observers/mod.rs and modules/testers/mod.rs

Dependency changes

  • Cargo.toml: adds ring = "0.17" as a direct dependency (no new crate in Cargo.lock; it was already there transitively).
  • Cargo.lock: rustls 0.23.37 → 0.23.45 and rustls-webpki 0.103.13 → 0.103.15, for RUSTSEC-2026-0285.
  • supply-chain/imports.lock and audits.toml refreshed for those versions (cargo vet).

Test plan

  • cargo test on this code (head 61ca4bf): 1549 passed, 0 failed (44 of them in the two GCP modules)
  • cargo clippy -- -D warnings and cargo fmt --check clean
  • GCP observer: metadata tests, config validation, mock HTTP integration (empty policy, compliant, permissive, editor role, multi-permissive, no bindings)
  • GCP tester: metadata tests, config validation, mock HTTP integration (401/403/404 blocked, 200 public, 500 unknown, transcript verification)
  • sign_rs256: a signature verifies against the matching public key and fails on a tampered message; malformed PEM and non-PKCS#8 input are rejected
  • No real GCP API calls in tests: all use local std::net::TcpListener mock servers
  • No private key is stored anywhere in this branch's history. The RS256 tests generate a throwaway key pair once per run with the openssl CLI, and the non-PKCS#8 error-path stub is a bare base64 body. An earlier version of the branch embedded a test key under a renamed PEM label so secret scanners would not see it, a scanner-evasion; that fix is folded into the feature commit, so no commit on the branch carries key material (verified commit by commit). gitleaks and trufflehog (all result types) find nothing in the file.

Provenance

All four commits were made with Claude Code and carry AI-Assisted, AI-Tool, AI-Model and AI-Role trailers. The two that change dependency manifests (0f394b3 the GCP feature, c7b9e25 the rustls bump) also carry AI-Dependency-Review: approved, recording the repository owner's review of exactly the changes listed under Dependency changes, given on 2026-10-12 before the trailers were written. The trailers were missing at first because on main the files in .sscsb/hooks/ are stored non-executable (mode 100644), so git skipped the commit-msg gate; #22 fixes that mode.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_012hwWMsTiv9Uf2gNbMh75uk

p4gs and others added 4 commits October 12, 2026 15:57
Add two new GCP modules:
- gcp.iam_policy observer: queries Resource Manager API for IAM policy
  bindings, checks for overly permissive roles (owner, editor, etc.)
- gcp.public_bucket tester: performs unauthenticated access probe against
  Cloud Storage buckets to verify public access is denied

Includes OAuth2 JWT-based service account authentication with RS256
signing for the observer, and full test transcripts for the tester.
Both modules use stdlib HTTP via ureq (no GCP SDK dependency).

Rebased onto current main (was 65 commits behind, 0 commits ahead
became 1) to resolve conflicts in Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock and the
observers/testers mod.rs registries against main's azure module and
Cargo.toml crypto-dependency changes.

During the rebase, the RS256 JWT signer was switched from the `rsa`
crate to `ring`: rsa's PKCS#1v1.5 signing has no constant-time
guarantee (RUSTSEC-2023-0071, the "Marvin Attack" -- the advisory's
patched-versions list is empty, i.e. no fixed version exists), which
this repo's cargo-audit/cargo-deny gates would flag. `ring` is already
a transitive dependency via rustls and is pre-certified safe-to-deploy
in supply-chain/audits.toml ([[trusted.ring]]), so this adds no new
dependency and required no new cargo-vet exemption. Added tests that
verify the replacement signer produces a real, cryptographically
verifiable RS256 signature (sign+verify round-trip against a known
public key, tamper detection, and malformed-key error paths) rather
than just exercising the code path.

Closes #12

The RS256 tests generate a throwaway RSA key pair once per run with the
openssl CLI (public half derived by openssl too, independently of the code
under test), so no private key is stored in the repository, and the
non-PKCS#8 error-path stub is a bare base64 body. An earlier version of this
branch embedded a test key under a renamed PEM label that hid it from secret
scanners; that is folded out of the history here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hwWMsTiv9Uf2gNbMh75uk
AI-Assisted: true
AI-Tool: Claude Code
AI-Model: Opus 4.6, Sonnet 5, Opus 5.5
AI-Role: draft
AI-Dependency-Review: approved
cargo-deny's advisory check (required by CI's deny job) flags rustls
0.23.37, pulled in transitively via ureq, for RUSTSEC-2026-0285: TLS
1.3 handshake messages were incorrectly accepted across encryption
level boundaries (the handshake transcript stays authenticated, so
this is not exploitable for tampering, but rustls should have
rejected the malformed sequence per RFC 8446 S5.1 and didn't).
Fixed upstream in 0.23.45; this bumps the same major.minor via
`cargo update -p rustls`, which also pulled rustls-webpki 0.103.13
-> 0.103.15. No Cargo.toml change needed -- ureq's own dependency
spec already allows this range.

This predates this PR: origin/main's own Cargo.lock already pins
0.23.37 and fails the same `cargo deny check` today, independent of
anything this PR changes. Fixing it here is necessary to get this
PR's own CI green regardless of origin.

cargo-vet initially flagged the two bumped versions as unvetted
(vet certifications are pinned per-version, not per-semver-range).
Both crates already carry long-standing [[trusted.*]] entries for
"safe-to-deploy" (rustls: Daniel McCarney through 2027-03-29;
rustls-webpki: three trusted publishers, same end date) -- the gap
was only that supply-chain/imports.lock's cached publisher record
was pinned to the old versions. Resolved via `cargo vet regenerate
imports` (refreshes the publisher cache from the configured import
sources) + `cargo vet fmt`, not by adding a new exemption or
weakening any criteria. `cargo vet check --locked` now succeeds with
the same 181 fully audited / 6 partially audited / 202 exempted
counts as before the bump.

Verified: cargo build --all-features, cargo deny --all-features
check all (advisories/bans/licenses/sources all ok), cargo vet
check --locked, cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy -- -D warnings (CI's
exact invocation) all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hwWMsTiv9Uf2gNbMh75uk
AI-Assisted: true
AI-Tool: Claude Code
AI-Model: Sonnet 5
AI-Role: refactor
AI-Dependency-Review: approved
CI's lint job (cargo fmt --check) requires rustfmt-clean source.
The GCP modules as originally authored predate this PR's rebase and
had drifted from the current stable rustfmt's formatting (mostly
line-wrapping of short call chains and fn signatures that now fit on
one line). No behavior change, cargo fmt only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hwWMsTiv9Uf2gNbMh75uk
AI-Assisted: true
AI-Tool: Claude Code
AI-Model: Sonnet 5
AI-Role: refactor
…ying

CI's unit-test step (cargo test --lib --bins) runs this suite, and
the IAM policy observer's HTTP-mock tests were intermittently failing
with "parsing GCP IAM policy response: Failed to read JSON: Invalid
argument (os error 22)" on the client side -- a different test each
run, reproduced locally in roughly half of repeated runs (both
--test-threads=1 and default parallelism).

Root cause: mock_server's acceptor did exactly one read() into an
8192-byte buffer and then wrote the response immediately. The
IAM-policy request carries Authorization + Content-Type headers and
a JSON body (more than github/okta/azure's simpler calls through the
same pattern elsewhere in this crate), so it's more likely to arrive
split across more than one TCP segment. When that happens, the single
read() only captures part of it; dropping the stream right after
writing the response then leaves bytes unread in the kernel receive
buffer, and the OS answers with an RST instead of a graceful close --
which corrupts the client's read of the response that was already
written, surfacing as this error on ureq's side.

Fix: loop reading with a short (50ms) read timeout until nothing more
arrives, before writing the response. This drains the request fully
without needing to parse HTTP framing (Content-Length, chunked, etc.)
and is bounded, so it cannot hang a test.

Verified empirically rather than assumed: 20/20 clean runs at
--test-threads=1 and 15/15 clean runs at default parallelism after
the fix (0 flakes in 35 runs), versus frequent failures before it
across the same kind of repeated-run sampling. cargo fmt --check and
cargo clippy -- -D warnings (CI's exact invocation) both still pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_012hwWMsTiv9Uf2gNbMh75uk
AI-Assisted: true
AI-Tool: Claude Code
AI-Model: Sonnet 5
AI-Role: test

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