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toPem(value, "CERTIFICATE") and getCertFromKeyInfo() read a certificate given as bare base64, which is how X509Certificate carries one, but the default getKeyInfoContent looked only for PEM CERTIFICATE messages and signed without KeyInfo. Read that form too. A value that is not a certificate in either form still signs without KeyInfo. The README described the signing publicCert as a public key, which produces no KeyInfo. It now says it is a certificate or a chain of them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signing with the default getKeyInfoContent and a string or Buffer publicCert that holds no certificate omits KeyInfo without saying so. Emit a process warning, once per process, naming the fix. A KeyObject, a custom getKeyInfoContent and an unset publicCert stay silent. 7.0 makes this an error (node-saml#598). Kept in its own commit so that review can drop it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthrough
ChangesCertificate publishing
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~20 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Low Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant SignedXml
participant utils
participant KeyInfo
Caller->>SignedXml: provide publicCert
SignedXml->>utils: validate PEM or bare Base64 certificate
utils-->>SignedXml: return certificate or no certificate
alt certificate found
SignedXml->>KeyInfo: publish certificate
else no certificate
SignedXml-->>Caller: omit KeyInfo
end
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Signing can fail when callers provide a malformed PEM-like 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 42.86% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 7 functions across 3 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.)
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…in order A Buffer of base64 text had started publishing its certificate, which the issue did not ask for; toPem() documents base64 as a string, so a Buffer is read for PEM alone, as before. The README no longer asks for the signing certificate first: XMLDSig 4.5.4 says no ordering is implied among an X509Data's certificates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
KeyInfo is optional (XMLDSig 4.5), so signing without one is valid output, and making it an error was declined as adding nothing to security or function. A warning for something that should not throw is code to maintain for no gain. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fallback wrapped the value with toPem() and unwrapped it with pemCertificates(). That parsed the certificate twice, and it was safe only because the second pass filtered out the PEM keys toPem() passes through unchanged. bareCertificate() refuses PEM outright, so no key can come out as a certificate, and the certificate is parsed once. toPem() shares its base64 check, so both read bare base64 alike. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
In `@src/signed-xml.ts`:
- Line 52: Update the certificate parsing flow around utils.pemCertificates and
utils.bareCertificate so both operations execute within the same try block.
Preserve returning parsed PEM certificates when available, fall back to the bare
certificate parser otherwise, and return an empty array from the catch block for
either parsing failure so signing can omit optional KeyInfo.
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bareCertificate() applies the base64 predicates itself, so toPem() keeps its shape. The bare public-key case was refused by the same certificate check as the bare private-key case, which is the one that matters. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Carving a Buffer out of the bare-base64 path took a branch, a comment and a README qualifier to forbid something harmless that no spec asks to forbid. getKeyInfoContent already read a Buffer as text, as Node's crypto reads a Buffer key, so it now reaches the same reader as a string. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Closes #605.
When signing,
publicCerthas one job: supplying the certificate forKeyInfo. The defaultgetKeyInfoContentlooked only for PEMCERTIFICATEmessages, so a certificate given as bare base64 was dropped, even thoughtoPem(value, "CERTIFICATE")andgetCertFromKeyInfo()both read that form. The README also described the signingpublicCertas "your public key", which produces noKeyInfoat all.Changes
publicCertholds no PEM certificate,getKeyInfoContentreads it as the bare base64 of one certificate. It publishes the value if Node'sX509Certificatereads it as exactly one certificate. For anything else it returnsnull, as before: this fallback catches its own errors, so no configuration that signs today throws. The PEM path keeps its existing errors.Bufferis read as text, asgetKeyInfoContentalready read one and as Node's crypto reads aBufferkey.publicCertis now described as a certificate or a chain of them. It can be given as PEM or as one certificate's base64 without the PEM boundaries, in aStringorBuffer. A value that holds no certificate produces noKeyInfo. The README requires no chain order, because XMLDSig 4.5.4 says "No ordering is implied" among anX509Data's certificates.Result
publicCertKeyInfoKeyInfoKeyInfo"not a certificate"KeyObjectBufferof bare base64 textKeyInfoBufferof DERA signature made with a bare-base64
publicCertverifies throughSignedXml.getCertFromKeyInfo.What stays with Node
Node's
X509Certificatedecides whether the bare base64 holds a certificate. The base64 check stays here: Node reads a certificate only from PEM or DER, andBuffer.from(value, "base64")silently drops characters it doesn't recognize, which is what #603 fixed.The fallback is an internal
bareCertificate(), which reads base64 given without boundaries as exactly one certificate. It refuses PEM outright rather than passing it through, so a key can't come out of it as a certificate. It parses the certificate as often as the PEM path does: twoX509Certificatecalls, the check #603 requires.toPem()is unchanged.No warning
The issue left a warning to review. It isn't here:
KeyInfois optional (XMLDSig 4.5), so signing without one is valid output, and making it an error was already declined as adding nothing to security or function. A warning for something that shouldn't throw is code to maintain for no gain. It was built in one commit and removed in a later one, so the net diff has none of it.Tests
These cover the issue's rows at the
SignedXmlboundary:KeyObject: existing tests in "omits KeyInfo when there is no content for it"."not a certificate", the bare base64 of a private key, and the bare base64 of a certificate with more data after it: added to thatdescribe. The last two aren't in the issue's table. They stop the new path from publishing a key, or a certificate with trailing bytes, as anX509Certificate.Buffer: "publishes a publicCert given as the base64 of a certificate, without boundaries". Before the fix it failed withexpected [] to deeply equal [ Array(1) ], meaning no certificate was published.Each safety property has a test that fails when it is broken. I checked this by mutating the code: skipping the certificate check, passing PEM through, or accepting bytes after the certificate each fail a test.
npm run build,npm test(433 passing), andnpm run lintall pass.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
Bug Fixes
<KeyInfo>.Documentation
publicCertformats and when<KeyInfo>is omitted.