[huangji6693-max]

Summary

Implements a re-entrancy guard (DataKey::ReentrancyGuard, TrustFlowError::ReentrancyDetected, with_reentrancy_guard) and enforces strict Checks-Effects-Interactions (CEI) ordering around all cross-contract token transfers in trustflow.

Changes

• contracts/trustflow/src/lib.rs:
  • Added DataKey::ReentrancyGuard, TrustFlowError::ReentrancyDetected = 24, and enter_reentrancy_guard / exit_reentrancy_guard / with_reentrancy_guard.
  • Enforced Checks-Effects-Interactions ordering and wrapped token client calls in with_reentrancy_guard across stake, unstake, create_escrow, init_escrow, release_milestone_tranche, and resolve_dispute so all storage accounting (JurorStake, EscrowRecord, EscrowStatus::Settled, EscrowReleased) is committed before external token::Client transfers execute.
  • Added unit test test_reentrancy_guard_blocks_malicious_token_callback verifying both direct guard re-entry rejection (Err(TrustFlowError::ReentrancyDetected)) and protection against a malicious token contract attempting to re-enter release_milestone_tranche during transfer.
• contracts/src/{settlement,errors,storage}.rs:
  • Updated release_to_beneficiary to persist EscrowStatus::Released before token_client.transfer under DataKey::ReentrancyGuard.

Verification

• cargo test --package trustflow (65 passed; 0 failed)

Closes #37
/claim #37

---

Payout Wallets

• EVM / Base (USDC): 0x380C97bcbcAEf29DAc2d0ba7E180F1b4A7F38fdd
• Stellar (XLM / USDC): GBYWLISGOUWQ43VQEGXX6KRGDZ3CKAFFK3JXVLXKDO5TIFJUJ3OHJYOZ
• Solana (USDC / SOL): AyXYaA9Nf4z5fpLKY6DmubWe6D2qveMd79w8pEDNHcDw