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Replace Iterator::sum() with try_fold + checked_add to detect iovec length overflow. When an attacker sends a crafted iovec array via sendmsg() where the sum of iov_len exceeds usize::MAX, the wrapping addition previously caused packet_len to wrap to a small value. This would lead to an undersized heap buffer allocation and subsequent heap buffer overflow when gather_to_buffer() copies the actual data. Fix: packet_len() now returns Option<usize>, returning None on overflow. The caller sendmsg() rejects the request with EINVAL when overflow is detected. CWE-190: Integer Overflow -> CWE-122: Heap Buffer Overflow
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Replace Iterator::sum() with try_fold + checked_add to detect iovec length overflow. When an attacker sends a crafted iovec array via sendmsg() where the sum of iov_len exceeds usize::MAX, the wrapping addition previously caused packet_len to wrap to a small value. This would lead to an undersized heap buffer allocation and subsequent heap buffer overflow when gather_to_buffer() copies the actual data.
Fix: packet_len() now returns Option, returning None on overflow. The caller sendmsg() rejects the request with EINVAL when overflow is detected.
CWE-190: Integer Overflow -> CWE-122: Heap Buffer Overflow