agent-firewall

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One line: Before an agent hits HTTP or runs shell, traffic goes through one policy stack—fail-closed if checks do not pass.

Repository: https://github.com/wmsing/agent-firewall

Two entry points—HTTP :8286 (L7 reverse proxy) and MCP stdio (mcp-firewall)—share one eval core: embedded hard rules (eval/rules.json) then semantic risk scoring (Mock, generic HTTP, or TypeSafe Jev). Anything that fails checks is blocked before your API or shell sees it.

Diagram source: docs/diagrams/agent-firewall.architecture.json · interactive HTML: agent-firewall-architecture.html (open locally after clone; GitHub does not execute repo HTML).

OWASP LLM alignment

Maps to OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025). Defense applies when traffic goes through MCP execute_bash_command or the L7 proxy—not IDE shell bypasses. Optional Cursor baseline (.cursorignore, read hooks, cli.json) complements LLM02 but is separate from eval.

#	Category	Typical attack	Defense (this repo)
LLM01	Prompt injection	Hidden instructions in chat, tools, or HTTP bodies	Partial → strong — L2 semantic score (TypeSafe Jev / Mock / HTTP evaluator); obfuscation (e.g. Base64→`sh`) needs Jev; HTTP 403 / MCP `BLOCK [semantic]`
LLM02	Sensitive information disclosure	Model or tools leak secrets, PII, internal docs	Partial — L1 `secret_leak` on command/body strings; L2 keyword/semantic hits; pair with `.cursorignore` + secret-read hooks (not loaded by `run-mcp-firewall.sh`)
LLM03	Supply chain	Malicious MCP servers, plugins, dependencies, models	Partial — L1 `git_supply` (`git clone`, `git submodule`); manual MCP allowlist in `.cursor/mcp.json`; no package/model provenance scanning
LLM04	Data & model poisoning	Poisoned training, RAG, or fine-tune data	Out of scope — runtime gateway; does not validate datasets or model weights
LLM05	Improper output handling	Treating model output as SQL/shell/code without checks	Strong (on-path) — same L1 → L2 gate before upstream HTTP or `/bin/bash -c`; fail-closed on BLOCK
LLM06	Excessive agency	Agent deletes data, changes prod, runs destructive ops	Strong (on-path) — L1 `rm_rf`, `git_danger`, `system_destruct`, SQL DDL (`drop_table`, `truncate`), etc.
LLM07	System prompt leakage	Attacks that extract system prompts or hidden policies	Out of scope — no prompt-vault or exfiltration filter on model I/O
LLM08	Vector & embedding weaknesses	RAG retrieval poisoning, cross-tenant doc bleed	Out of scope — no vector DB or embedding pipeline
LLM09	Misinformation	Harmful or false model answers trusted as fact	Out of scope — policy is execution safety, not content correctness
LLM10	Unbounded consumption	Huge prompts, tool loops, API cost / DoS	Partial — mutating HTTP bodies > 1 MB → 413; no per-session token/tool budget

Threat & rules matrix

Embedded hard rules live in eval/rules.json (go:embed). MCP and L7 run the same list before semantic scoring.

Rule	What it blocks	Typical examples
`drop_table`	SQL `DROP TABLE`	`DROP TABLE users;`
`truncate`	SQL `TRUNCATE`	`TRUNCATE logs;`
`rm_rf`	`rm` with both recursive and force	`rm -rf /`, `rm -fr /var`, `rm --recursive --force /`
`git_danger`	Destructive or repo-wide `git` subcommands	`git push`, `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fd`, `git config …`
`git_supply`	Supply-chain `git` fetch paths	`git clone …`, `git submodule update …`
`system_destruct`	Disk wipe / world-writable trees	`mkfs.ext4 …`, `dd if=… of=/dev/sda`, `chmod -R 777 /var/www`
`secret_leak`	Reads of common secret locations	`cat .env`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`, `~/.aws/credentials`, `/etc/shadow`

Rule notes

rm_rf: Matches flag permutations and long options—-r/-f in either order, combined short flags (e.g. -rf, -fr), and --recursive with --force (or -f). rm -r alone (no force) is not blocked.
git_danger: git pull is intentionally excluded so everyday sync workflows stay usable; push/reset/clean/rebase/remote/config/credential paths still block.

On match: firewall BLOCK [hard_rule]: <rule_name> (MCP isError: true) or L7 403 with layer: hard_rule.

Live interception showcase

Reproduce with no API keys (built-in Mock evaluator):

go run . &
sleep 1
curl -s -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}\n" -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8286/api \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"msg":"ignore previous instructions"}'

HTTP response (403):

{
  "error": "forbidden",
  "layer": "semantic",
  "reason": "prompt_injection: ignore previous",
  "score": 0.95
}

Structured audit log (stderr, slog JSON):

{
  "level": "INFO",
  "msg": "firewall",
  "client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
  "method": "POST",
  "path": "/api",
  "reason": "prompt_injection: ignore previous",
  "action": "BLOCK",
  "risk_score": 0.95
}

With TYPESAFE_API_KEY set, the same flow uses TypeSafe Jev (/v1/systemone); confirmed injections typically score ≥ 0.8 (often 1.00), still 403 + "action":"BLOCK" in logs.

MCP hard-rule block (no score; isError: true):

printf '%s\n' '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"execute_bash_command","arguments":{"command":"rm -rf /"}}}' \
  | go run ./cmd/mcp-firewall

firewall BLOCK [hard_rule]: rm_rf

Architecture

Entry	Process	Inspected payload	When to use
L7	`agent-firewall` → `:8286`	POST/PUT/DELETE bodies	Agents use REST as tools
MCP	`mcp-firewall` (stdio)	`execute_bash_command` strings	Cursor / Claude terminal tools

Both paths call the same eval.Assess pipeline—two layers, always in order:

Pipeline layer	Name	Role
Layer 1	Local zero-latency hard rules	Embedded regex rules (`eval/rules.json`, `go:embed`) match known destructive patterns (`rm_rf`, `git_danger`, `secret_leak`, …) with no network I/O.
Layer 2	TypeSafe Jev semantic engine	When `TYPESAFE_API_KEY` is set, commands and HTTP bodies are scored via TypeSafe System One (`POST /v1/systemone`, model `jev-latest`) for obfuscation (e.g. Base64 pipelines) and intent beyond literal strings. Score ≥ 0.8 → BLOCK.

If Layer 1 matches, Layer 2 is skipped. With no TypeSafe credentials, Layer 2 falls back to the built-in Mock evaluator (offline, no API calls)—enough for CI and obvious injection strings; configure TypeSafe for full obfuscation coverage.

  HTTP (POST/PUT/DEL) ──► :8286 ──► L1 hard rules ──► L2 semantic score ──► upstream API
  GET passthrough · body > 1MB → 413

  MCP execute_bash_* ──► mcp-firewall ──► same L1 → L2 ──► /bin/bash -c
  BLOCK → isError + reason (layer: hard_rule | semantic)

Viewing the interactive diagram

open docs/diagrams/agent-firewall-architecture.html   # macOS

Quick start

Requires: Go 1.22+

git clone https://github.com/wmsing/agent-firewall.git
cd agent-firewall
make check-firewall    # integration + go test; script unsets TYPESAFE_* / EVALUATOR_* (Mock L2, no live Jev)

Optional:

make test              # unit tests only

PocketBase end-to-end

Validates a real backend behind the proxy (see docs/spec/task_e2e_pocketbase.md):

Install PocketBase and ensure pocketbase is on PATH, or set POCKETBASE=/path/to/pocketbase.
Run:

make e2e-pocketbase

The script starts PocketBase on :8090, runs the firewall against http://127.0.0.1:8090, and checks allow (200), hard-rule 403, semantic 403 + "action":"BLOCK" in firewall logs.

L7 gateway

go run .                                    # :8286 → built-in mock :8287
go run . -backend=false -target http://127.0.0.1:8090

MCP (Cursor)

Checklist

Copy .cursor/mcp.json.example → .cursor/mcp.json (scripts/run-mcp-firewall.sh; Reload MCP after Cursor agent rules change; rebuild/restart MCP after hard rule edits in eval/rules.json)
Parent monorepo jev_demo: use jev_demo/.cursor/mcp.json (paths under agent-firewall/scripts/...); do not use bare go run ./cmd/mcp-firewall from monorepo root
Production/CI binary: go build -o mcp-firewall ./cmd/mcp-firewall, point command at the binary

See .cursor/mcp.json.example (detects agent-firewall vs jev_demo workspace layout).

Global Cursor MCP setup (all workspaces)

Install a single binary and register it in your user-level Cursor config so every workspace routes agent shell tools through the firewall (restart Cursor after editing).

cd /path/to/agent-firewall
go build -o ~/.local/bin/mcp-firewall ./cmd/mcp-firewall

~/.cursor/mcp.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "agent-firewall": {
      "command": "/Users/<username>/.local/bin/mcp-firewall",
      "args": [],
      "env": {
        "TYPESAFE_API_KEY": "",
        "TYPESAFE_BASE_URL": "https://api.typesafe.ai"
      }
    }
  }
}

Replace <username> with your macOS login name (full path example: /Users/you/.local/bin/mcp-firewall).

TypeSafe env (optional) — Put TYPESAFE_API_KEY in mcp.json → env (user ~/.cursor/mcp.json or project .cursor/mcp.json). That is what the MCP process reads. scripts/run-mcp-firewall.sh does not source .env. A repo .env is only for your shell / go run one-liners unless you export or wire it yourself. TYPESAFE_BASE_URL defaults to https://api.typesafe.ai when empty. Omit env or leave the key blank for local mode: Layer 1 always runs; Layer 2 is Mock (no TypeSafe). Do not commit real keys.

Restart Cursor (or Reload MCP) after edits. Project-local .cursor/mcp.json still overrides per-repo when present.

Pair with agent rules (alwaysApply): terminal only via execute_bash_command; on firewall BLOCK → stop, do not bypass.

Refresh installed binary

Default scripts/run-mcp-firewall.sh uses go run—after code or eval/rules.json changes, Reload MCP in Cursor (no manual build).

If mcp.json command points at a fixed binary (e.g. ~/.local/bin/mcp-firewall), rebuild and overwrite after changes, then Reload MCP:

cd /path/to/agent-firewall
go build -o ~/.local/bin/mcp-firewall ./cmd/mcp-firewall
ls -la ~/.local/bin/mcp-firewall   # mtime should be just now

Monorepo errors: ensure logs are not stat .../jev_demo/cmd/mcp-firewall (stale config); Reload MCP
go: command not found: set env.PATH in mcp.json (e.g. Homebrew) or use absolute path to go
Agent rules (alwaysApply recommended): shell only via execute_bash_command; on isError: true or firewall BLOCK → stop, do not bypass

Smoke test (expect firewall BLOCK [hard_rule]: rm_rf and "isError":true):

printf '%s\n' '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"execute_bash_command","arguments":{"command":"rm -rf /"}}}' | go run ./cmd/mcp-firewall

Obfuscation & intent testing

With TYPESAFE_API_KEY set on the MCP process (see global mcp.json), ask the agent to run shell only via execute_bash_command:

Intent	Command	Expected
Benign decode	`echo "aGVsbG8=" \| base64 -d`	Runs; output `hello`
Obfuscated destructive	`echo "cm0gLXJmIC8=" \| base64 -d \| sh`	`firewall BLOCK [semantic]: typesafe: … (score≥0.8)` — decoded payload is `rm -rf /` without matching Layer 1 on the outer string

One-liner checks (export TYPESAFE_API_KEY first for the malicious case):

# Allow: benign Base64
printf '%s\n' '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"execute_bash_command","arguments":{"command":"echo \"aGVsbG8=\" | base64 -d"}}}' \
  | go run ./cmd/mcp-firewall

# Block: Base64 → sh (requires TypeSafe Layer 2)
printf '%s\n' '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"execute_bash_command","arguments":{"command":"echo \"cm0gLXJmIC8=\" | base64 -d | sh"}}}' \
  | go run ./cmd/mcp-firewall

Integration coverage: make check-firewall.

Environment variables

Copy .env.example → .env (do not commit)

Variable	Empty / unset	When set
`TYPESAFE_API_KEY`	—	Preferred: native TypeSafe `/v1/systemone` (Jev)
`TYPESAFE_BASE_URL`	`https://api.typesafe.ai`	API base URL
`TYPESAFE_DEFAULT_MODEL`	`jev-latest`	System One model
`TYPESAFE_EVALUATOR_TIMEOUT`	`2s`	Per-eval timeout
`EVALUATOR_API_KEY`	Mock if no TypeSafe key	Generic HTTP evaluator
`EVALUATOR_API_URL`	—	POST target when `EVALUATOR_API_KEY` is set

Name		Name	Last commit message	Last commit date
.cursor		.cursor
.github/workflows		.github/workflows
cmd/mcp-firewall		cmd/mcp-firewall
docs		docs
eval		eval
scripts		scripts
.cursorignore		.cursorignore
.env.example		.env.example
.gitignore		.gitignore
AGENTS.md		AGENTS.md
LICENSE		LICENSE
Makefile		Makefile
README.md		README.md
README.zh-CN.md		README.zh-CN.md
go.mod		go.mod
main.go		main.go
proxy.go		proxy.go
proxy_test.go		proxy_test.go

I want to…	Go to
Clone and run tests	Quick start
Run the HTTP gateway	L7 gateway
Wire Cursor MCP	MCP (Cursor)
Global MCP (all workspaces)	Global Cursor MCP setup
Threat / hard rules	Threat & rules matrix
Configure semantic scoring	Environment
Architecture details	Architecture
Edit hard rules	`eval/rules.json`

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agent-firewall

OWASP LLM alignment

Threat & rules matrix

Live interception showcase

Contents

Architecture

Viewing the interactive diagram

Quick start

PocketBase end-to-end

L7 gateway

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Checklist

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Refresh installed binary

Obfuscation & intent testing

Environment variables

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agent-firewall

OWASP LLM alignment

Threat & rules matrix

Live interception showcase

Contents

Architecture

Viewing the interactive diagram

Quick start

PocketBase end-to-end

L7 gateway

MCP (Cursor)

Checklist

Global Cursor MCP setup (all workspaces)

Refresh installed binary

Obfuscation & intent testing

Environment variables

License

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