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Security: zozo123/forgefs

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

ForgeFS is security-sensitive infrastructure. Please do not open public issues for suspected vulnerabilities that could expose data, bypass capabilities, corrupt repository state, or weaken sealed verification.

Reporting

Use GitHub's private security advisory / vulnerability reporting flow for this repository when available. Include:

  • affected commit or release;
  • minimal reproduction steps;
  • expected vs. observed security boundary;
  • impact and attacker prerequisites;
  • any proposed fix or test, if known.

Supported versions

Until the first stable release, only the current main branch is supported for security fixes.

Security invariants

Security fixes must preserve ForgeFS's core guarantees: immutable content-addressed bytes, monotonic capability attenuation, snapshot-consistent agent work, explicit conflicts, fail-closed verification, and trusted sealed releases.

Dependency upgrades

Treat major dependency upgrades on the trusted path as security-sensitive changes, not routine batch maintenance.

  • Land at most one major crate upgrade per pull request and rebase it onto current green main before evaluation.
  • Exception, for crates whose traits are too coupled to compile apart: bump the set in one pull request and state the coupling in the description. sha2 and hmac must agree on a single digest major version, so bumping either alone fails to satisfy Sha256: hmac::digest::core_api::CoreProxy; #401 moved both together and superseded the split Dependabot PRs #397 and #398. Such a set is still held to the review bar of a single major upgrade.
  • Require the workspace tests with the committed lockfile plus clippy with warnings denied; the repository's Rust, MSRV, and e2e checks must be green before merge.
  • Review security/correctness call sites affected by API changes, especially CAS/ref updates, capability verification, identifiers/randomness, object encoding, and metadata durability.
  • Never merge several independently green lockfile pull requests without revalidating their combined current-main merge result.
  • If a generated lockfile merge conflicts or becomes invalid, recreate it from the manifests rather than hand-splicing dependency records.
  • Workflow/action-only upgrades may proceed separately when their CI is green.

There aren't any published security advisories