feat(runtime): refuse an egress policy the host tier cannot enforce - #1143
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mattwilkinsonn
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A host child shares the host's network namespace, so the nftables arm the container tiers run has no boundary to attach to. The host backend now reports that through an egressUnenforcer marker, and provision refuses any configured policy instead of dropping it silently — a caller must never believe egress was constrained when nothing constrained it. The marker is deliberately separate from inGuestEgressArmer: that one means someone armed the firewall, this one that nobody did and nobody can. AgentRuntime.EgressPosture reports which, so a session surface can show an uncontained launch as uncontained. The refusal keys on the policy's presence, not a non-empty allowlist: an empty allowlist is pure default-deny, the strictest posture, so keying on length would reject a looser policy and silently discard the tightest one.
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This PR is part of a stack containing 10 PRs:
mainA host child shares the host's network namespace, so the nftables arm the
container tiers run has no boundary to attach to. The host backend now reports
that through an egressUnenforcer marker, and provision refuses any configured
policy instead of dropping it silently — a caller must never believe egress was
constrained when nothing constrained it.
The marker is deliberately separate from inGuestEgressArmer: that one means
someone armed the firewall, this one that nobody did and nobody can.
AgentRuntime.EgressPosture reports which, so a session surface can show an
uncontained launch as uncontained.
The refusal keys on the policy's presence, not a non-empty allowlist: an empty
allowlist is pure default-deny, the strictest posture, so keying on length
would reject a looser policy and silently discard the tightest one.