Fleet Studio B2b (#1540) — remote peer-studio control + live streaming - #1547
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jeonghun-jj-lee merged 5 commits intoSep 24, 2026
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…dmin authority + self-owned control issuance Grant foundation slice of ADR 0034 (D3): the NET-NEW lifecycle-admin authority persistence, the self-owned control fast-path, and the owner-resolvable control grant read #1542 needs. All additive; peer studios stay additive. - @amicode/schema: fleet_lifecycle_authority.ts — the shared on-disk authority store contract (record shape, path, writer, resolver) at ~/.amico/fleet-lifecycle-authority.json, env-overridable. The cross-package seam is a shared on-disk contract (amico-run writes, the extension reads), the same pattern as fleet_roster/fleet_config — never a cross-package import. - amico-run: `amico fleet enroll` (client redeem) records the enroller as this machine's lifecycle-admin authority via an injectable recordLifecycleAuthority seam with a real default — enroll stays byte-identical when defaulted. - extension fleet_lifecycle_authority.ts: the service-side resolver ("who holds authority for machine X"), feeding management-verification and #1545 routing. - extension fleet_control_bootstrap.ts: evaluateControlBootstrap (a NEW predicate mirroring evaluateObserveBootstrap, which refuses control) — self-owned + management-verified authorizes; every other case requires approval (no privilege bleed). management-verified is a DEFINED predicate (enroll-seeded authority + serving peer + held reader token). enableSelfOwnedControl mints an ACTIVE control grant on the explicit enable, no target-side interaction. - fleet_control_lifecycle.ts: findControlGrantByTarget — resolves the controlling machine's own active control grant by targetMachineId, with its token (ADR D2). - AC3 (control-not-auto-restored) is a regression guard on the landed fleet_headless_rehydration.ts — a test asserts it, no re-implementation. Tests: new fleet_control_bootstrap + fleet_enroll_authority suites; extended fleet_control_lifecycle, fleet_headless_rehydration, and amico-run fleet_enroll_verb suites. All touched suites green; typecheck clean; amico-run bundle gate + INVARIANT_STRICT additive gate pass.
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added 4 commits
September 24, 2026 16:34
…ote writes Mirror the #1537 observation READ seam for WRITES, with the GET/non-GET decision INVERTED: a NON-GET request (prompt/archive/delete) to a peer-owned session is authorized by the pure evaluateRemoteWriteGate and, when allowed, proxied to the owner; GET is ignored (the read plane owns it); local/unowned/ non-session/amicode writes fall through byte-identical. - ObservationWriteRouter (session_multiplexer.ts): resolve() inverts GET, authorizes via the gate, returns a peer target | named deny | undefined. - D2 grant-key fix: grantReader resolves the controlling machine's OWN active control grant by targetMachineId === owner (findControlGrantByTarget, #1541), NOT a requesterMachineId-keyed lookup that would deny every write. - createObservationWritePlane (new observation_write_plane.ts): its OWN proxyToPeer via HubProxy, presenting the PEER reader token the owner accepts (NOT the control token, which the owner has never seen and would 401; NOT the ControlGatedResolver adapter, which drops the peer credential). Honest boundary documented: a distinct owner-enforced control token is future work. - Dispatch wiring (server.ts): ObservationWritePlane interface + observeWrite seam + attachObservationWritePlane; consult beside observeRead inside if (this.engineProxy) — allowed proxies to the owner, transport-down is the peer-unreachable 503, auth denials (no-control-grant/grant-revoked/ insufficient-scope) are a 403 carrying the gate's real reason, NEVER local. Structural no-op when unattached (byte-identity). - index.ts: attach the write plane in the observation branch, wired from fleetPeers (owner map, serving peers for reachability + credential) + the lifecycle grant deps. Part of #1540. ADR 0034 D2/D4/D5.
…033 D1-D4) A NEW, separately-armed observation /event interception that reuses SseFanInDriver as a library (ADR 0034 D6 / ADR 0033 Amendment 1): NOT the premium fleet-plane wire, NOT behind AMICO_FLEET_MULTIPLEX, NOT behind the multiplexer. Armed on observation readiness (the driver declines at zero non-local owners = the fleet-of-one byte-identity guard); no focus-snapshot provider on this path so byte-identity holds. Per-peer arms auth as themselves with their own reader token; local arm rides the app credential. - server.ts: observeEvents field + attachObservationEventPlane + a separate /event dispatch consult beside (never replacing) the premium wire. - index.ts: attach a SseFanInDriver in the observation branch, wired from fleetPeers (ownerMap/localMachineId/localEventUrl/peerBaseUrl/peerToken). - +5 tests: fleet-of-one byte-identity oracle (vs no-plane), live peer fan-in, cursor pass-through, inert-when-unattached, production wiring (peer /event dialed with the reader token). Premium server.ts wire + fleetMultiplexEnabled untouched (the #1519 invariant test stays green). Director-run recovery (autodev honest degradation): the dispatched implementer session was interrupted with nothing written; worktree was pristine. Part of #1540.
…losed affordances
State channel (Data Contract): amicode_control { controlState, reason, eligibility }
rides the fleet projection (GET /amicode/fleet/sessions) as a sibling of
amicode_owner — the SINGLE carrier, derived from remote_session_state.ts (the SoT,
preserving distinct reasons the write gate collapses). All five SoT reasons
enumerated: no-control-grant, grant-revoked, revocation-pending, insufficient-scope,
transport-down. The app consumes it off DropdownSession.
Session surface:
- Fail-closed chip: disabled write affordances + visible human-readable reason per
state (never a live erroring button).
- Enable control (self-owned): dispatches amicode.fleet.enableControl to the VS Code
native-modal confirm; on success the projection flips to interactive + the driving
banner lights.
- Request control (shared): affordance present, dispatches to the #1545 request route
(backend not yet built — honest inert placeholder).
- Persistent driving banner: Portal to document.body, data-driving-peer hook (assertable),
survives intra-session navigation.
- Owner-routed remote-delete: built (reuses arm→confirm interaction over the #1542 write
plane's owner-routed path), attached to the session timeline.
- Archive: no discrete confirm (per D4).
- Fleet Manager grant panel: list + enable/disable/revoke affordances; pending-requests
stub for #1545.
- Sidebar: read-only preserved (control surfaces on session + Fleet Manager only).
Director-run recovery (autodev honest degradation): dispatched implementer interrupted
with 15 files of uncommitted work — reviewed, gates run, committed.
Part of #1540.
…hake Net-new shared-peer control path (ADR 0034 D3, slice 5): - fleet_control_request.ts: pending-request store (file-based, keyed, state machine: pending → approved|denied), submit/approve/deny operations. Injectable deps, env-overridable path (AMICO_FLEET_CONTROL_REQUEST_FILE). - Server routes: POST /amicode/fleet/control-request (submit), /control-approve (authority-gated, mints control grant), /control-deny (no grant). All under /amicode/fleet/* (never-proxied). - Route matrix: control-approve/deny added to LIFECYCLE_ADMIN_PREFIXES (only lifecycle-admin authority can approve or deny). - GET /amicode/fleet/grants now returns live pending_requests (replaces the #1544 empty stub). - fleet_control_bootstrap.test.ts extended: 3 new tests pin the shared-peer arm (bootstrap → submit → approve → grant, deny path, no-privilege-bleed invariant). - fleet_control_request.test.ts: 26 tests covering the store, submit, approve, deny, fail-closed, already-granted, multiple requesters, and route-matrix enforcement. Invariants: - Shared path NEVER borrows the self-owned fast-path (no privilege bleed) - Fail-closed: no approval → no control grant - A headless target renders nothing; approval is from the authority holder Closes #1545
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Fleet Studio B2b (#1540) — remote peer-studio control + live streaming on the observation path
One integration PR for the whole B2b DAG (parent #1540, slices #1541–#1545), targeting
feature/free-tier-fleet. Design-of-record: ADR 0034 (D1–D7) + ADR 0033 Amendment 1, both in-base. Every slice is TDD (RED→GREEN), additive, and grounded against the deliberate-review corrections that bind on the issues.Slices (all GREEN, director-verified)
lifecycle-adminauthority store (net-new,@amicode/schema) seeded atamico fleet enroll; extension-side resolver; net-newevaluateControlBootstrap+ definedmanagement-verifiedpredicate; self-ownedcontrolissuance;findControlGrantByTarget. +26 tests.targetMachineId(D2 fix), token via ownproxyToPeer; honest deny; byte-identity. +25 tests./event, separately-armed on observation readiness; premiumserver.tsgate untouched;SseFanInDriverreused as library. +5 tests.amicode_controlstate channel on the fleet projection; Enable/driving banner (Portal,data-driving-peerhook); fail-closed reason chips (distinct SoT vocabulary); owner-routed remote-delete; Fleet Manager grant panel; sidebar read-only. +81 app tests, +18 ext tests.POST /amicode/fleet/control-request+ pending store; approve/deny routes gated tolifecycle-admin; approval mints control grant; no privilege bleed. +29 tests.Final gate battery (all GREEN on 669500d)
E2E verification (partial — the ext-host isn't running)
GET /session/ses_f3df…→200with both the standalone cred and the peer reader token.d2cbf0f2, channel=dev).To deploy + verify (for the reviewer)
Closes #1540